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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Policy Research Working Paper 5669
The Punjab Female School Stipend Program, a female-
targeted conditional cash transfer program in Pakistan, 
was implemented in response to gender gaps in 
education. An early evaluation of the program shows 
that the enrollment of eligible girls in middle school 
increased in the short term by nearly 9 percentage points. 
This paper uses regression discontinuity and difference-
in-difference analyses to show that five years into the 
program implementation positive impacts do persist. 
Beneficiary adolescent girls are more likely to progress 
through and complete middle school and work less. 
This paper is a product of the Public Sector Unit of the Independent Evaluation Group. It is part of a larger effort by the 
World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at jebaez@worldbank.org.  
There is suggestive evidence that participating girls delay 
their marriage and have fewer births by the time they are 
19 years old. Girls who are exposed to the program later, 
and who are eligible for the benefits given in high school, 
increase their rates of matriculating into and completing 
high school. The persistence of impacts can potentially 
translate into gains in future productivity, consumption, 
inter-generational human capital accumulation and 
desired fertility. Lastly, there is no evidence that the 
program has negative spillover effects on educational 
outcomes of male siblings.   
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Many developing and transition countries have implemented some modality of conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) program to incentivize poor households to make investments in the human capital 
of their children.  These programs are a popular tool for alleviating short-term poverty and 
reducing the inter-generational transmission of poverty.  Though CCTs have some basic 
elements, they vary in terms of scale, transfer size, conditionalities, eligibility, and many 
implementation features. In spite of these differences, evidence arising from impact evaluations 
indicates that most of these programs fulfill their short-term objectives through increases in 
immediate consumption and use of educational and health services. Indeed, a recent literature 
review shows that CCTs increased the consumption of participant households and 87 percent 
raised the school enrollment and attendance of children (World Bank, 2010). 
 
  However, little is known about the longer-term impacts of these programs on human 
capital accumulation and measures of human welfare. Most evaluations to date only assess 
immediate changes in behaviors related to school attendance, enrollment and visits to health 
centers. While these investments are critical for the accumulation of human capital of children, 
such changes say little about whether the accumulation is taking place and whether immediate 
impacts also influence the future prospects of children in their progress in school, productivity 
and employability (Filmer and Schady, 2009).
2 Likewise, the evidence is thin regarding indirect 
effects on outcomes such as marriage and fertility decisions, which have plausible implications 
for the long term on the welfare of the beneficiaries. 
 
  This paper contributes to the literature by focusing on the impacts of a gender targeted 
CCT program in the longer-term. The program investigated is the Female School Stipend 
Program (FSSP) which was implemented in the province of Punjab, in northeast Pakistan.  The 
evaluation identification strategy relies on a regression discontinuity design.  The analysis 
focuses on examining impacts on school progression, middle and high school completion, early 
labor market outcomes, marriage and fertility decisions of adolescent girls who have been 
participating in the program for up to four years. The paper also measures distributional impacts 
                                                           
2 Evidence from CCTs in Mexico and Cambodia, for instance, suggests that the programs increased grade progression but did not 




across various participant groups and explores spillover effects of the program on the enrollment 
of boys. 
 
  Results shows that after four years of implementation, participant girls are 3 to 6 
percentage points more likely to complete middle school; and younger cohorts of girls who are 
exposed to the program later-on have a greater likelihood of transitioning to high school (by 4 to 
6 percentage points) and completing at least one high school grade (by 5 percentage points).  In 
terms of labor market outcomes, the positive effects of the program on progression and 
completion seem to be accompanied by a reduction in the labor force participation of beneficiary 
adolescent girls of 4 to 5 percentage points.  In addition, the younger cohorts of girls also appear 
to work at least two to three hour less per day relative to non-participants. Lastly, there is some 
evidence (marginally significant in statistical terms) that participant girls (between 15 to 19 years 
of age) tend to delay their marriage by 1.4 years and have 0.3 fewer children.  
 
2. Related Literature 
The last decade has seen a substantial increase in the prevalence of CCTs and, with it, a parallel 
increase in impact evaluations that assess their effectiveness. The wave of CCTs and evaluations 
started with the Mexican Oportunidades program, which has been operating since 1997. 
Evaluations of the program based on a randomized design and multiple rounds of panel data 
show significant positive impacts on school enrollment and attainment, child labor, immediate 
consumption, and some health outcomes (Gertler, 2000; Hoddinott et. al., 2000; Behrman et al., 
2001; Schultz, 2004). These assessments have been corroborated by subsequent evaluations of 
similar interventions in Brazil, Honduras, Colombia, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Turkey, Pakistan, 
Malawi, and El Salvador. For the most part, their findings are consistent with the results of the 
Oportunidades program regarding positive impacts on the use of educational and health services 
and short-term consumption (Olinto et al., 2003; Glewwe and Olinto, 2004; Attanasio and 
Mesnard, 2005; Attanasio et al., 2005a and 2005b; Filmer and Schady, 2006; Maluccio and 
Flores, 2005; Ahmed et al., 2007; Chaudhury and Parajuli, 2008; Baird et al., 2009). 
   
  In addition to positive effects on school attendance and enrollment, some evaluations also 
suggest that grade progression improves with CCTs. For instance, de Janvry et al. (2006) show 




experimental analysis of the Honduras PRAF II program finds that the probability of 
matriculating to subsequent grades increases by 2 to 4 percentage points among beneficiary 
children. Comparable effects have also been documented for CCT programs in Mexico, 
Nicaragua, and Paraguay (Behrman et al., 2001; Maluccio and Flores, 2005; Veras Soares et al., 
2008). 
 
  The literature also gives evidence on the indirect effects of conditional transfers on the 
labor market outcomes and marriage and fertility decisions of adolescents, which are thought to 
operate mostly through the conditionalities that require children to attend school regularly. In 
fact, rigorous evaluations of programs in Brazil, Cambodia, Colombia, Mexico, and Nicaragua 
confirm that treated children not only spend more time in school but also have relatively lower 
participation in income generating activities and domestic work (Behrman et al., 2005; Maluccio 
and Flores, 2005; de Janvry et al., 2006; IFS – Econometria - SEI, 2006; Ferreira et al., 2009). 
This effect is also observed among adolescent females. For example, the Oportunidades program 
in Mexico lowers the participation of young girls in labor markets and child care by around 10 
percent and 40 percent, respectively (Behrman et al., 2005; Dubois and Rubio-Codina, 2009). 
Furthermore, increased time spent in school and improved knowledge could also result in 
changes in marriage, sexual and fertility decisions. It is shown that CCTs have caused delays in 
marriage and onset of sexual activity in Malawi and Mexico, reductions in the number of sexual 
partners in Malawi, and reductions in pregnancy rates in Malawi and Turkey (Baird et al., 2009; 
Behrman et. al., 2005; Gulemetova-Swan, 2009; Ahmed et. al., 2007). 
   
  Evidence regarding the impacts of CCTs designed to explicitly address gender disparities 
in investments in human capital, such as the program evaluated in this paper, shows that they 
have succeeded in increasing school enrollment and attendance of girls. At least four 
interventions that were set up to address these issues achieve positive impacts in the short term. 
The Bangladesh Female Secondary Stipend Program is shown to raise the enrollment of girls in 
sixth through eighth grade, by 8 to 12 percent (Khandker et. al., 2003). Similarly, the Zomba 
Cash Transfer experiment in Malawi more than doubles the re-enrollment of girls between 13 
and 22 years old who had dropped out of school before (Baird et. al., 2009). Another example is 
the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction Scholarship Program in Cambodia, which has a large 




Schady, 2006).  A most directly related to this analysis, the short-term impact evaluation of the 
FSSP in Pakistan –the program analyzed in this paper –shows an increase in the enrollment of 
girls of about 9 percentage points between 2003 and 2005 (Chaudhury and Parajuli, 2008).  
Although the impacts of these studies differ by magnitude, and the empirircal approaches vary, 
results appear to be consistent across programs and implementation contexts. 
   
  Nonetheless, the evidence of the connection between the provision of incentives for 
school participation and the well-being of adolescent girls in the longer-term remains very thin. 
Therefore, this paper aims to begin filling this evidence gap by assessing whether girls who 
benefited from a school stipend program show improved outcomes in the longer-term, or up to 
four years after their first exposure to the program.  
 
3. Schooling Context and the Project  
Schooling in Punjab 
 
The literacy rate in Punjab in 2003 was approximately 54 percent (45 percent in Pakistan as a 
whole) compared to 56 and 63 percent for South Asia and all low income countries, respectively 
(Lloyd, 2004).
3 Divided into 36 districts (34 districts at the time the program began), Punjab is 
home to over 55 percent of the total Pakistani population.  
   
  School enrollment in Punjab, particularly in secondary education, is largely constrained 
by the scarcity of schools. Primary education is supplied by both public and private schools.  On 
the contrary, the secondary level is dominated by the public sector, and not every village has 
access to middle schools (grades 6 to 8) and high schools (grades 9 and 10).
4 For instance, 
whereas 84 percent of the households in Punjab report that their children are within walking 
distance (15 minutes) of a primary school, only 55 percent of the households have access to a 
middle or high school within the same travel time (Pakistan Social & Living Standards 
Measurement Survey - PSLM, 2004). Differences in access are even larger in rural areas, making 
it even far less likely that children in rural villages enroll in schools at these levels (Andrabi et 
al., 2006; Sathar et al., 2003). In 2003, before the program started, while enrollment in primary 
                                                           
3 Estimates for Pakistan and region were obtained from published documents ―Pakistan at a Glance‖ 2004 available online; 
Punjab estimates were derived from the MICS 2003-04 Report, table titled Major Summary Results. 




school for children aged 6-10 was 58 percent, enrollment at the middle school level for children 
aged 11-14 was 29 percentage points lower (Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey – MICS, 2003).  
   
  Education levels of females are low, both in absolute and compared to boys, especially in 
rural areas. At baseline, girls in program areas were less likely than boys to be enrolled in school. 
While enrollments in primary and middle school were very similar for boys and girls in non-
stipend districts, large differences are observed in stipend districts – up to 8 percentage points 
(MICS, 2003).  Such gaps in enrollment by gender are even wider when the samples are 
restricted to rural areas of Punjab.  In terms of school attainment, numbers for 2001 (before the 
program started) show that women in Pakistan achieved on average 4.9 and 1.3 years of 
schooling in urban and rural areas, respectively – about 1.9 and 2.8 fewer years of education than 
men. These disparities by gender are also evident for Punjab, where the levels of enrollment and 
educational attainment are systematically lower for women in rural and urban areas (Table 1). 
   
  Finally, there are also marked differences in school enrollment and access between 
districts in Punjab covered and not covered by the GSP program. Enrollment levels in program 
districts were well below those of non-stipend districts. In 2003, for instance, enrollment in 
primary school for children aged 6 to 10 was 20 percentage points lower in stipend districts; 
similarly, only 20 percent of children 11-14 years old were in middle school compared to 34 
percent in non-stipend districts (MICS, 2003). As shown in Table 2, access to school was also 
more difficult in stipend districts before the program began, where higher fractions of households 
live in villages without a school and, thus, their children had to travel longer distances to go to 
school (MICS, 2003; PSLM, 2004). 
 
The Female School Stipend Program 
 
The FSSP was designed as part of a broader educational reform of the Provincial Government of 
Punjab (GoP) to improve the educational attainment among girls and decrease gender inequities, 
particularly at the middle school level.
5 Prior to the start of the program, as noted before, female 
enrollment in primary and secondary schools was low, both in absolute terms and relative to that 
                                                           
5 The Punjab Education Sector Reform (PERSP) seeks to address flaws identified in the educational system, including: lack of 
infrastructure  or  substandard quality  of  infrastructure,  which  limited  access  to  schools;  bad  quality  of  service  delivery  and 
financial management; limited capacity of staff at all levels of the system; weak community and parental involvement; and a rise 





6 Additionally, low enrollment for girls is further compounded by low retention and 
completion rates (Sawada and Lokshin, 2009). A large body of analytical work has identified 
various community characteristics (access to roads, transport, share of teachers that reside in the 
village where the school is located, scarcity and poor quality of schools for girls) and household 
characteristics (poverty status of the family, school costs, parental education and occupation) that 
are associated with gaps in school entry for girls (Khan, 1993; Sathar and Lloyd, 1994; Lloyd et 
al. 2005; Das et al. 2006; Lloyd at al. 2007). In response to this, the GoP mobilized resources in 
2003 to finance the FSSP seeking to target a clearly disadvantaged group (girls) in districts with 
lagging literacy rates. None of the ineligible districts were covered by the FSSP but were still 
eligible for other components of the wider educational reform, such as the distribution of free 
textbooks, school rehabilitation, and new teachers, among other things.
7 
   
  The main goal of the FSSP was to promote participation in public education for girls in 
middle school (grades 6 through 8).
8 Program benefits comprise a quarterly stipend of 
approximately PKR 600 (equivalent to US$10) per female student.
9 Beneficiary girls were 
targeted based on their district of residence (districts with the lowest literacy rates in the province 
– below 40 percent), and enrollment in eligible grades (grades 6 through 8) in public schools; 
eligibility was conditional on a minimum school attendance rate of 80 percent, as reported 
regularly by the school. 
  
  The FSSP started in late 2003 and covered 15 eligible districts. Although planning for the 
program began in early 2003, stipends were not distributed until the first quarter of 2004, with 
compensation for attendance in the fourth quarter of 2003, as reported and accounted by the 
monitoring unit. During the first quarter of the program, about 156,000 girls received the stipend. 
In 2006, the FSSP was extended to include high school (grades 9 and 10); however, the impact 
                                                           
6 The gender disparity in Pakistan is well established in the literature; for example, authors such as Khan (1993), Behrman and 
Schneider (1993), Alderman et al. (1995), Alderman et al. (2001), Holmes (2003), Lloyd et al. (2005), and a gender assessment 
by the World Bank (2005) make this point clearly. 
7 Parts of these activities were either phased in throughout the province over the years based on need or were implemented only  
in places where demand was most salient. In this respect, the evaluation accounts for three components that could potenti ally 
affect the outcome of the GSP: school improvements
7, the recruitment and allocation of new (probably better qualified) teachers, 
and the phased distribution of free textbooks to all primary school children. 
8 Since 2006 a public subsidy to low cost private schools was put in place; this program known as stipend to Foundation Assisted 
Schools covers girls in approximately 50 percent of the GSP program. Additionally, an education voucher scheme was also 
implemented throughout Punjab, but targeting and modality are orthogonal to the program. 
9 It is estimated that the costs of schooling per quarter are approximately $9, leaving some funds left over for the family to use for 




of this extension is not the main focus of this paper. The FSSP is still active in Punjab, and as of 
2007, it covered 245,000 beneficiaries in middle school, which correspond to a take-up rate of 51 
percent.
10 According to actual quarterly stipend data, the program spent around US$7.3 million 
in 2007 on stipends for grades 6 through 8. 
   
  A previous impact evaluation of the FSSP investigated the short-term impacts of the 
program on female enrollment. The evaluation uses difference-in-differences (DD) and 
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) models on provincial school censuses to estimate net 
growth in female enrollments in grades 6-8 (middle school) from 2003 (before the program 
started) to 2005 (two years into the program) and in stipend public schools relative to non-
stipend public schools.  Other models estimated compare the differences in female growth 
enrollment relative to male growth enrollment in a triple-difference framework. Even though the 
magnitude of program impact estimates varies across different models, this evaluation found 
that the FSSP increased the number of females enrolled in grades 6-8, on average, by 9-23 




This paper estimates the impact of the program with information at the school and household 
levels. The main data source for the first approach is the Punjab public school census collected 
annually in October from 2003 to 2009 by the provincial education department, including data 
from before and during the program implementation. It covers all public schools in Punjab and 
focuses on school information (including village name and date of establishment), infrastructure, 
teaching staff, enrollment, and some organizational indicators.
11 The enrollment data are reported 
by gender of the school and separated into different grade levels. Schools are also disaggregated 
by urban and rural areas. The total number of schools is 60,000-62,000 from 2003-04 to 2009-
10, however the sub-sample for this analysis is a pool of cross-sectional data that includes 
                                                           
10 The take-up rate is difficult to calculate because eligibility to the program is determined by the grade, and not the age, of girls 
in stipend districts. For simplicity, this analysis estimates the take-up rate as the ratio of participants (245,000 girls covered by the 
program in 2007) relative to the sum of the actual and potential participants (those enrolled in grade 6-8 in private schools and 
those whose highest grade is 5-7 but are not enrolled at the time of the survey). 
11 This survey is part of the  institutional strengthening capacity effort within the PERSP and is used for monitoring resource 
allocation and performance in the sector. The survey does not cover private and religious schools in Punjab; a private school  
census was undertaken in 1999-2000, on the basis of which it was estimated that over one-quarter of all students were enrolled in 




approximately 4,000 middle schools for girls in stipend and non-stipend districts. These are the 
schools that could be eligible for the program at both baseline and follow-up.
12  
   
  In order to extract contextual information and construct covariates, this analysis uses 
several household surveys. The household surveys include the Pakistan Social and Living 
Standard Measurement survey (PSLM) collected in 2004-05, the Punjab Multiple Cluster Survey 
(MICS) collected in 2003, and the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) collected in 
2001. They use multi-topic questionnaires focusing on a comprehensive set of social and 
economic indicators as well as information on infrastructure supply and quality, thus allowing 
for construction of some covariates at the district level. These surveys are representative at the 
district level and disaggregated by urban and rural areas.
13  
   
  Other sources include educational censuses and administrative data that provide 
information on the supply of educational services and other programs. This evaluation uses the 
National Education Census collected in 2005 on both public and private schools to construct 
additional covariates. It also relies on the administrative data of other elements of the educational 
reform implemented in Punjab at the same time as the FSSP, such as distribution of free 
textbooks, recruitment of new teachers, construction of school facilities, and improvement of 
school councils.    
 
  The main data source for the estimation of impacts at the individual level is two waves of 
the MICS collected in 2003 (pre-program) and 2007-08 (post-program). This household survey 
covers a wide range of social and economic indicators, all repeated in both rounds for 
comparability. The sampling design follows the sampling frame of the previous population 
census (1998) and provides estimates for the province, for urban and rural areas, and for each of 
the districts in Punjab and the Cantonment of Lahore. Sampling for 2003 was stratified by rural, 
urban, and large city areas. In the follow-up survey in 2007-08 the sample size was vastly 
                                                           
12 The sample of eligible schools includes only girls’ schools that offered grades 6-8 at both baseline and follow-up (less than 1 
percent of middle schools are mixed). Schools that were nonfunctional upgraded to middle level or above or downgraded to 
primary or lower level during the program implementation period were excluded, as these would not have been eligible for the 
stipend at both baseline and follow-up. Of the remaining schools, only those schools that had non-zero enrollment in grades 6-8 
at both baseline and follow-up were retained. Finally, although in theory all public schools in Punjab are single-gender, the data 
shows that a small number of mixed schools exist. These schools were also excluded from the final sample.  
13 It is important to note that, although lower -level data provide more precise estimates, the questionnaires are significantly 




enlarged to increase the precision and make it representative at the Tehsil level (a level below the 
district). The total number of surveyed households is 30,932 in 2003 and 91,280 in 2007-08. For 
the empirical models of this paper, the analysis uses pooled cross-sectional data comprised of 
girls aged 12-19 selected based on the criteria described above. 
   
  The surveys used to construct covariates for the school-level analysis are again used for 
the household-level analysis. This includes the PSLM, which relies on a similar sampling 
strategy as the MICS. Other data come from the PIHS, the National Education Census, 
administrative data of other programs under the PESRP, and the annual Punjab public school 
census collected in 2003. 
   
  Given the targeting of the program to low-literacy districts, stipend and non-stipend 
districts are likely to differ in aspects other than the treatment and a baseline comparison 
confirms this. Since literacy rates are likely correlated with other underlying socio-economic 
characteristics, such factors may, in turn, be associated with different education attainment and 
divergent trajectories in human capital accumulation between households in stipend and non-
stipend districts. Indeed, as shown in Table 3, at the community level, households in stipend 
districts are more likely to be below the poverty line, to be located in a rural village, and to spend 
a little less on education. The stipend districts also have less access to public transport and to 
schools of different levels (defined as a distance of two kilometers or travel time of 15 minutes) 
as well as fewer private middle schools relative to public schools. At the school level, schools in 
stipend districts tend to have worse school facilities, but the differences are very small, except 
for electricity. On the other hand, stipend schools exhibit more favorable student-teacher ratios. 
Finally, at the household level, households in stipend districts appear to have more dependents 
and be headed by individuals with approximately 1.6 fewer years of education. They are also less 
likely to have dwellings connected to gas and electrical services, and to have access to family 
planning and health centers. 
   
  In order to deal with potential biases that may rise due to these differences, we run 
econometric specifications which control for factors at the community, school, and household 
levels that could contribute to the outcomes, as well as district and cohort-fixed effects. Control 




mean values at baseline. Furthermore, econometric models in the analysis also add binary 
indicators to control for the plausible effects of other programs related to improving the 
education system within the PERSP.
14  
5. Empirical Strategy 
 
As the FSSP was not randomly allocated, a simple comparison of girls in stipend and non-
stipend districts is unlikely to identify the causal effect of the program on the outcomes of 
interest. Due mainly to budgetary constraints, the FSSP was rolled out only in the neediest 
districts of Punjab (those with literacy rates below 40 percent). In total, 15 out of 34 districts, 
most of which are located in southern Punjab, were eligible for the program (Annex A). This 
targeting may pose an obvious selection problem since stipend districts were chosen based on 
characteristics (possibly both observed and unobserved) that may be correlated with low 
educational attainment. Moreover, there are two further issues that could make it difficult to 
identify the causal effect of the program in the absence of a reliable counterfactual. One is 
participation bias, namely families which decide to enroll girls in public middle school and 
therefore participate in the program may be different from other families with girls in relevant 
ages but not in public school. The other issue is the focus on outcomes that are conditioned on 
the enrollment of girls. In this case, the samples for analysis may suffer from negative selection 
bias if they include lower-ability girls in stipend areas that would not have attended school in the 
absence of the program.15 
   
  Since the program design and implementation did not plan for an impact evaluation, no 
specific data were collected for the purpose of evaluation based on a counterfactual framework. 
                                                           
14 The covariates used in the models include: (1) Community-level variables: access to schools (distance to primary, middle, and 
high schools, and access to public transport), school supply across education levels (ratio of primary to middle schools and 
middle to high schools), share of the private sector in total enrollment (private/public enrollment ratio), dropout rates at different 
education levels, poverty (poverty headcount ratio), and share of education in household expenditures; (2) School-level variables: 
proxy of school quality (student/teacher ratio), school facilities (electricity, drinking water, toilets, and boundary walls); (3) 
Household-level variables: access to basic services (health care, water, electricity and gas), location (rural or urban), household 
structure (household size and dependency ratio), birth order, and parental education (education of household head); (4) other 
programs: distribution of free textbooks, recruitment of contract teachers, construction of school facilities, and strengthening of 
local school councils. 
15 Another potential concern for identification strategy is that school enrollment/attendance and labor force participation are joint 
decisions. However, this is problematic for analyses that focus on the relationship between the use of school inputs (enrollm ent 
and attendance) and labor market participation. In contrast, this paper exploits the extra incentive provided by the stipend and the 
conditionality to send girls to school which this analysis argues to be exogenous after controlling for some observables at t heir 
baseline values, time-invariant unobserved factors between stipend and non -stipend districts (through DD method), and the 




We attempt to overcome some of the issues discussed above with the use of cross-sectional data 
at the school and household levels from 2003 through 2009 and quasi-experimental methods. 
More specifically, the analysis contrasts cohorts of girls in treatment and control districts in 
double-difference and RDD frameworks.
16 While double-differencing compares the changes in 
the outcomes of analysis between stipend and non-stipend districts overtime, RDD exploits the 
literacy rate cut-off for program eligibility across districts. The RDD models are also 
implemented within a DD framework as done by Chaudhury and Parajuli (2008). Therefore, both 
models compare the trends in stipend and non-stipend districts, which helps address possible 
selection bias introduced by time-fixed characteristics related to nonrandom program placement. 
In order to check the sensitivity of the findings to the issue of participation bias, additional 
models were estimated with samples that do not condition on enrollment in middle school.
17 The 
validity of the identifying assumptions of the DD models and the implications on the expected 
selection on returns to schooling are discussed in the robustness section.  
   
  We construct treatment and comparison groups of girls at both the school and household 
levels.  At the school-level, the analysis draws upon administrative data from school censuses to 
estimate the annual average changes in total female enrollment at public schools in stipend 
districts (treatment schools) for the period between 2004 and 2010 relative to the pre-program 
level (2003-04 academic year). These changes are then compared with the corresponding annual 
changes in female enrollment observed for public schools in non-stipend districts (control 
schools) during the same period. This approach is limited, however, by the fact that schools are 
the units of analysis, and it is not possible to tease out other behavioral responses regarding the 
investments in the human capital of girls. 
   
  To overcome that, we also use household surveys to estimate changes at the individual 
level. The research design for this approach follows for the most part the same identification 
strategies and assumptions as the school-level analysis. However, the richness of information of 
the household-level data, as compared to school censuses, allows the analysis to take advantage 
                                                           
16  It was not possible to also use matching techniques with the pool of cross-sectional data available. The only common level of 
aggregation between baseline data —that would be used to predict program participation and construct the propensity score for 
each household— and follow up data was the district. This implies that matching is only possible at the district level and the 
province has only 34 districts. 
17  These samples are restricted to girls who finished primary school (having at least five years of schooling). Additional 
econometric exercises also show that the GSP program did not have indirect effects on either enrollment  in grades 4 and 5 or 




of the extra variation at the individual level and the better accuracy in measuring girls’ exposure 
to the program. The outcomes of interest at this level include relative changes between baseline 
(2003) and follow-up (2007-08) in partial measures of school attainment (middle school 
completion, and high school enrollment and completion), labor market participation, marriage, 
and fertility. The comparison is made between cohorts of girls with various levels of exposure to 
the program in stipend districts (treatment cohorts) and similar cohorts in non-stipend districts 
(control cohorts). Program impact estimates at the school and household levels should be 
interpreted as impacts on all eligible girls, whether or not they participated in the program 
(intent-to-treat impacts).




The treatment and comparison cohorts of girls for this analysis are constructed synthetically 
based on their enrollment at different grades. The treatment cohorts were enrolled in public 
middle school in stipend districts; thus, they should have been exposed to the program for at least 
one year between baseline (2003-04) and subsequent academic years up to 2009-10. Based on 
these criteria, seven distinct cohorts can be identified (Table 4). The counterfactuals consist of 
the corresponding cohorts enrolled in public schools in non-stipend districts. For example, a 
cohort that consists of girls in grade 6 in stipend districts in 2004-05 is expected to progress to 
grade 7 through 10 in the succeeding years between 2005-06 and 2008-09. If their progress 
through school is consistent, they should have been exposed to the program for all three years of 
middle school (grades 6 to 8) between 2004-05 and 2006-07, and to the expansion of the stipends 
to girls in high school (grades 9 and 10) which started in 2006-07. Girls in the corresponding 
cohort but in non-stipend districts should not have been exposed. 
 
  The outcome of interest for this analysis is the percentage change in grade level 
enrollment (grades 6-10 each), which is estimated using the following specification: 
                                            (1) 
 
                                                           
18 In the context of the GSP, the intent-to-treat analysis measures changes in female enrollment of public schools in stipend 




Where i indexes schools, X includes baseline socioeconomic characteristics, FSSP is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 for a stipend-eligible school and 0 otherwise.    measures the net 
impact of the stipend program. 
 
  Therefore, the school-level analysis measures whether the increase in enrollment 
experienced by a cohort when they first joined the program (the short-term impact) is continued 
through successive grades relative to the trend observed for the comparison cohort. A sustained 
increase in net enrollment could be due to increased transition across grades (the push effect), 
reduction in drop-out rates, and/or influx of new entrants (including both rejoiners and those who 
switch schools). Yet, the school-level approach cannot distinguish these channels of impacts 
since the school censuses do not provide information to measure them separately. However, 
preprogram and post-program data from household surveys indicate that female rejoining (new 
entrants) and grade repetition at the middle school level is very low.
19 This suggests that net 
changes in female enrollment (if they happen) are largely driven by the combined effects of the 




The units of observation used for this analysis consist of girls expected to be exposed to the 
program for at least one year between 2003-04 and 2007-08. Although the household survey data 
used for this analysis provide rich information on a wide variety of indicators, they do not 
contain explicit information on the treatment status and length of exposure of girls to the FSSP. 
   
  Therefore, some steps were taken to select the girls who fall within an age range and are 
likely to have been exposed to the program for at least one year. The motivation for constructing 
synthetic cohorts based on age and grade criteria, as opposed to only an age based criterion, was 
to arrive at a cohort that is more reflective of actual participants
20 Annex B explains more fully 
                                                           
19 Both rejoiners and repeaters constituted around 0.5 percent of total enrollment in middle school at baseline. Not only were 
these rates similar between stipend and non-stipend districts in 2003-04, there has been no differential growth in these rates 
between 2003-04 and 2007-08. School switching is another source of compositional change within the cohort. At baseline, 
around 2 percent of all children enrolled in middle schools switched from private to public schools while a similar proportion 
switched from public to private (the difference is statistically insignificant). So at baseline, compositional shifts stemming from 
re-entry, repetition and school switching accounted for some 5 percent of total enrollment in middle school level. There are no 
comparable data on school switching in the 2007-08 survey, but the change in repetition and rejoining rate at the middle school 
level remained comparable between stipend and non-stipend districts between 2003-04 and 2007-08.        
20 The previous impact evaluation of the FSSP (Ch audhury and Parajuli 2008) used cohorts of children 10 -14 years old from 




the construction of the cohorts for analysis, and addresses the assumptions and concerns 
underpinning the construction. Girls are included in the treatment cohorts if they live in the 
stipend districts and in the comparison cohorts if they live in non-stipend districts. In addition, 
both groups have to meet one of the following criteria to ensure that the analysis is restricted to 
the relevant girls, namely those who could enroll in middle school for at least one year during the 
period of study:  (a) girls who were enrolled in grades 7-12 in 2007-08 and/or grades 6-11 in the 
previous year (2006-07) are assumed to have been exposed for at least one year to the program; 
(b) for the rest of the girls who were enrolled in neither 2007-08 nor 2006-07, only those whose 
highest grade completed is at least grade 6 and at most grade 10, and who are likely to have been 
enrolled in a middle school grade between 2003-04 and 2005-06 (based on the age-grade 
distribution of the reference cohort at baseline) are assumed to have been exposed for at least one 
year to the program. 
   
  We use the household data to estimate the influence of the program on such longer-term 
outcomes as educational attainment and labor market, marriage, and fertility decisions. The 
general specification of the base regression equations for the DD analysis is as follows:  
 
                                                                                          (2) 
 
where i indexes individuals, t is the time subscript, T is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for 
post-program year and a value of 0 for the pre-program year, FSSP identifies the location of the 
girl between stipend and non-stipend districts, and X is a vector of baseline household 
demographics, community-level characteristics, and measures of education market place and 
school quality. P is a vector of dummy variables to capture other programs that were introduced 
by the GoP along with the FSSP and sought to build school facilities, provide free textbooks, 
recruit contract teachers, and revitalize school councils.
21 The outcomes of interest (Y) measure 
educational outcomes (middle school completion, middle to high school transition, high school 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
distribution of girls in middle school in Punjab indicates that this cohort has errors of inclusion and exclusion. More specifically, 
the youngest girls of this cohort (10-11 years old) have a high probability to remain in primary school whereas a substantial 
fraction of girls 15-17 who attend school are enrolled in middle school.      
21 These programs were per se not targeted at stipend districts but could have been implemented differentially: for instance, girls’ 
schools in stipend districts were worse off and it is possible that any program on rehabilitation of school infrastructure would 




completion), labor force participation (extensive and intensive margins) marriage and fertility.
22 
The coefficient   , the interaction of time and treatment status, gives the average net impact of 
the program. Additional specifications of this model also include district and cohort fixed effects. 
Because observations within a district could be serially correlated, standard errors are clustered 
at the district level. 
   
  We also estimate program impacts in a RDD framework, exploiting the fact that 
assignment to the stipend district (beneficiaries) is determined by a threshold base on the average 
literacy rate of the district (Chaudhury and Parajuli, 2008). Thus, girls in stipend districts with 
literacy rates of 40 percent or less are eligible for FSSP, with all girls in districts above the 40 
percent literacy threshold comprising the control group. The RDD specification includes a 
control function L for distance of district literacy rate (subscript D) from the cutoff. It is assumed 
that the control function is linear, making this a parametric specification. The identifying 
assumption here is that making treatment status conditional on literacy would imply treatment to 
be independent of the error term given the literacy rate. The general specification of the RDD is 
as follows:  
 
                                                                             (3) 
 
  The parametric RDD specification extrapolates from above and below the cut-off point to 
all observations in the data, and allows for use of covariates. A batch of RDD specifications is 
run adding covariates and new programs to equation (3). To avoid misspecification issues arising 
from the functional form, we also estimated non-parametric RDD models with different 
bandwidths and weights on either side of the discontinuity.     
 




Theory provides ambiguous results on the effects of this sort of program on grade progression, 
school completion, and educational attainment. The cash transfer has an income effect. This is 
                                                           
22 A possible caveat to this analysis is that the girls studied were still young (12 to 19 years old) at the time of the follow-up 
survey. This means that many had probably not reached their full educational attainment and were not yet married or have 
children. However, this age range is still relevant for the analysis of program effects on early marriage and childbearing, both of 





the only effect relevant for families that would have sent their daughters to middle school with or 
without the program. At the same time, for families with daughters out of school, the program’s 
condition on school attendance also induces a substitution effect since it reduces the price of 
education.  
   
  Both effects point toward an increase in the demand for education, particularly among 
credit-constrained households in environments with imperfect capital markets. On the one hand, 
if this demand is sustained over time, the higher utilization of education services can lead to 
higher school progression and completion. On the other hand, there might be perverse incentives 
or constraints that prevent program participants from accumulating more human capital. For 
example, families may try to keep their daughters in those grades that make them eligible for the 
transfers, in effect preventing them from progressing and graduating. Moreover, assuming no 
changes in supply, schools in program areas may become overcrowded due to the additional 
demand, which can hinder progression and completion. We seek to shed some light on the net 
effects of these conflicting forces in the context of the FSSP. 
   
  The analysis based on school-level data provides systematic evidence that the program 
helps girls progress through middle school. The point estimates from DD and RDD models 
indicate that the program raises enrollment not only in grade 6 but also in grades 7 and 8 for the 
same cohorts (Table 5).
23  For instance, cohort C sees higher percentage changes in enrollment in 
stipend than in non-stipend districts in both grade 7 in 2005-06 and grade 8 in 2006-07 (the 
second and third year of exposure to the program). The increases relative to enrollment in stipend 
versus non-stipend are 18 and 32 percent, respectively. Although the relevant cohorts (cohorts B 
to G) participate in the program at different times and for different periods, estimates of program 
effects on enrollment yield consistent results for all of these cohorts and grades over time 
(positive and significant impacts). The insignificant impacts in 2004-05 are expected since 
                                                           
23 The school-level approach measures changes in absolute enrollment between stipend and non-stipend districts. These changes, 
however, may be driven by a plausible mechanical relationship between higher fertility, population growth, and the number of 
girls enrolled given that stipend districts are poorer. Unfortunately, there are no school-level data available to do the estimation 
for a pre-program period and check if changes in enrollment in stipend district occurred even before the program began. Yet, the 
empirical  models  include  a  number  of  socio-economic  covariates  at  their  baseline  values  which  are  also  likely  to  explain 
differences  in  fertility  between  stipend  and  non-stipend  districts.  Furthermore,  the  analysis  at  the  household  level  looks  at 




awareness of the program was not widespread during its first year.
24 For subsequent cohorts, 
program impacts are still large and statistically significant, ranging from 11 to 32 percent.
25 
Impacts of comparable magnitude have been found in similar female-targeted CCTs in 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Malawi (Khandker and others 2003; Baird and others 2009; Filmer 
and Schady 2006). 
   
  An interesting result is that program impacts on female enrollment increase with school 
grades for the same cohort. Several factors may be behind this. First, the program might have 
incentivized girls who had left the education system to re-enter school. However, this does not 
seem to explain the changes for middle school grades since re-entry is not only very low (less 
than 0.5 percent) but also similar across stipend and non-stipend districts. Second, and more 
plausible, the program may have differential effects in retaining girls in schools, perhaps more in 
higher grades. Dropout rates in Punjab (as in most developing settings) increase with grades and 
age. In fact, a simple DD analysis between 2003-04 and 2007-08 using household survey data 
shows a decrease of 2-3 percentage points in drop-out rate in middle and high school grades in 
stipend districts, relative to non-stipend districts, while there are not changes in dropout rates for 
noneligible grades. Finally, the expansion of the FSSP in 2006-07 to cover grades 9 and 10 may 
provide additional incentives for girls to finish middle school and transition to high school.   
   
  The findings also show that the increases in enrollment attributed to the program remain 
as long as girls are enrolled in middle school. However, such effects are not continued to grades 
9 and 10. Point estimates of the effects on enrollment in grade 9 only become positive and 
statistically significant for some econometric specifications in the academic year 2007-08 and 
2009-10 when the expansion of the FSSP to high school was fully implemented. This may 
suggest that this second phase of the program has positive impacts on enrollment in high school.   
   
  The evidence on school progression based on household-level data seems to validate the 
findings obtained with school data as it also suggests that the program increases the chances that 
                                                           
24 Qualitative evidence based on interviews with officials in charge of implementing the program indicates that campaigns to 
raise the awareness of the existence of the program began only at the second year of the program. 
25 The parameter of interest for the models discussed here is changes in the number of girls relative to number of girls enrolled at 
baseline. For instance, if the numbers of girls enrolled increased by five (from 16 to 21), this corresponds to a 32 percent  change 
in enrollment. This, however, should not be confused with a change in enrollment rate in percentage points. Suppose that the 
universe of girls that should be enrolled in middle school is 100, the increase in enrollment rate in percentage points for the above 




girls complete middle school. Overall, results summarized in Table 6 indicate that 12-17 year-old 
girls who were exposed to the program (for different periods) between 2003-04 and 2007-08 are 
on average around 3.3 percentage points more likely to have completed middle school (grade 8) 
relative to the control cohorts. This is equivalent to an increase of 4.5 percent relative to the 
baseline value of the treatment group.
26 The impacts on middle school completion are larger for 
girls aged 15-16 (6 percentage points with 5 percent significance) but none for girls older than 
16.  
   
  We also find some evidence that the program helps girls transition from middle to high 
school and complete grade 9, especially those younger than 17.
27 The first outcome analyzed is 
the probability that a girl enrolled in grade 8 during the program period progressed to grade 9 or 
beyond.
 28 The average impact for the entire cohort of 12-19 years old girls is not statistically 
significant (Table 6). However, for girls aged 15-16, the impacts are positive and significant (5.5 
percentage points relative to a baseline value of 58.5 percent). This cohort is also 5 percentage 
points more likely to complete grade 9 than the control group (Table 7). One reason for this is 
that these younger girls benefit more from the FSSP as they are not only exposed longer but they 
joined the program when there was more awareness of its existence. Second, and perhaps more 
important, only the younger cohorts have the additional incentives induced by the expansion of 
the FSSP, which began in 2006, to also provide conditional transfers to enrollees in high school.  
 
Labor Market Outcomes 
 
Theoretically, the direction of the effects of the FSSP on working behaviors of the beneficiaries 
in the longer-term is unclear. While the program introduces incentives for girls to spend more 
time in school and work less, if girls are an important source of labor for the household, they 
may give up leisure time rather than working less. Moreover, girls are expected to obtain better 
jobs and higher wages as they progress through school and accumulate more education. At the 
                                                           
26 Evidence of similar impacts has been also found for Bolsa Escola and PRAF II, two CCT programs in Brazil and Honduras (de 
Janvry and others 2006; Glewee and Olinto 2004). 
27 2007-08, the year of the follow-up survey, may be too early to capture the impacts on this younger cohort (that is, age 15 -16) 
of the program on high school (that is, grade 10) completion, as the majority of girls enrolled in grade 10 at the time of th e 
follow-up survey are aged 15-16 
28 The transition from middle to high school is a critical juncture in schooling attainment in Punjab as well as the rest of Pakistan, 
particularly in poor rural communities. In fact, rates of transition from middle to high school were low at baseline. The 
distribution of school attainment (measured as the number of years of schooling) for adolescents and adults exhibits a significant 




same time, schooling might have diminishing marginal returns and increasing marginal costs. 
Thus, girls have more incentives to join the labor market as their ages and years of accumulated 
schooling increase. Additionally, since the FSSP seems to facilitate school progression, girls may 
begin working at earlier ages if they are able to complete their desired schooling sooner. In sum, 
while it is more possible that the program would decrease working in the short-term, the 
combination of these other factors may have an ambiguous impact on working over the long 
term. In order to shed light on this, this section presents results of program impacts on two 
outcomes related to work for girls aged 12-17: labor force participation and time devoted to 
working.  
   
  Participation in labor markets (the extensive margin of labor supply) is proxied by the 
probability of looking for a job and participation in work for pay or unpaid work (unpaid family 
helper and unpaid work outside the home). Results of DD and RDD models indicate that there is 
a statistically significant reduction in the labor force participation of around 4-5 percentage 
points among girls in stipend districts, which is largely driven by a reduction in girls’ 
participation in unpaid family work. Point estimates of all empirical models are not sensitive to 
different specifications, sub-samples, or approaches. Furthermore, the decrease in labor force 
participation is notable. Four years after the program started, the labor force participation rates of 
girls 12-19 are almost equal between stipend and non-stipend districts even though they were 
roughly 4-5 percentage points higher for the former group at baseline. Unfortunately, there are 
no available data (regarding time use, for example) to further investigate whether this reduction 
in labor participation is fully or partly explained by the extra time spent by beneficiaries in 
school-related activities (Table 8).  
   
  We also examine the effects of the program on the intensive margin of the labor supply 
for those girls who are working for pay at the time of the survey. Samples are restricted to not 
only girls that work, but also those that are 15-19 years old since no comparable data exist at 
baseline for younger cohorts. Although the average impact on girls 15-19 is statistically 
insignificant, the results indicate that cohorts aged 15-16 worked 7 days less per month (around 




percent level). This is also consistent with the hypotheses described earlier about higher impacts 
for the younger cohorts (Table 8).
 
Marriage and Fertility Outcomes 
There are multiple channels through which the program could influence marriage and fertility 
outcomes. Most of these channels are transmitted through the effects of the program on the 
decisions about education (and perhaps also work) — as girls have more incentives to stay in 
school longer, they could delay their marriages and sexual activity and alter their decisions about 
fertility (such as timing of childbearing, birth spacing, and total fertility rates). On the other 
hand, if the program increases grade progression and help girls finish school earlier, they might 
move into marriage and childbearing sooner.
29  
   
  Furthermore, social norms and cultural tradition in Pakistan may figure prominently in 
marriage and fertility decisions, such as making it difficult for girls to resist the pressure of 
marriage and child bearing. Besides, the local socioeconomic determinants of marriages may 
mean that the additional schooling brought about by the program could increase the economic 
status of women and with it the chances of getting married. When combined, these different 
factors could manifest themselves as opposite effects. Therefore, establishing the net effect of the 
FSSP is, to a large extent, a matter of empirical analysis.  
   
  We first investigate the possibility that the program changes the probability of marriage 
and age at marriage for girls aged 15 to 19. Overall, estimates from DD and RDD models do not 
show any impacts of the program on the probability of being legally married. However, when 
looking at age at marriage, the analysis identifies that after the program started girls in stipend 
districts are likely to marry about 1.2-1.5 years later. Results are significant in statistical terms 
and consistent across model specifications and subsamples with different age cohorts. 
   
  The analysis then turns to the impacts of the program on fertility outcomes. The sample 
for this part of the analysis consists of girls aged 17 to 19, since these are the ages when girls are 
most likely to have been married and possibly given birth. This group of girls was likely to 
receive the stipend during the early years of the program (2004-05) but not likely to be enrolled 
                                                           




in middle school at the time of the survey (2007-08). The first outcome indicator measures the 
probability that girls have given birth. This analysis reveals no differential effects on the 
probability of girls 17-19 having given birth. A second exercise looks at the number of births 
given for the sub-sample of girls who became mothers during the period under study. The 
empirical analysis based on this sample indicates that, relative to the control group, girls exposed 
to the FSSP have on average 0.3 fewer children. However, this result is marginally significant 
around the 10 percent level.
30 Even though both are partial measures of fertility given the young 
age of the girls and do not reflect fertility targets, the findings may still signal some changes in 
fertility that may be sustained over the long-term. In the event that the total fertility rates of both 
treatment and control groups converge over time, the reduction in the number of children by 
early adulthood still implies that girls in stipend districts tend to delay their subsequent births 
(Table 9).  
 
Heterogeneity of Program Impacts 
 
This section presents evidence on the heterogeneity of the FSSP effects across some 
socioeconomic characteristics of program beneficiaries such as socioeconomic status, parental 
education, location (rural or urban), age, and length of exposure of the beneficiaries.
31 We first 
find that girls who live in rural villages and have parents with no education benefit much less 
from the program in terms of the probability of completing middle school, but their labor 
participation also decreases more. The evidence indicates that most educational benefits (as 
measured by middle school completion) attributed to the program accrue to girls who belong to 
households in urban centers and have parents with at least primary education. On the other hand, 
these girls also reduce their participation in the labor market less than girls living in rural areas 
and with parents that have no education. Unfortunately, with the data available, it is not possible 
to tease out the underlying reasons that may help reconcile the lower school attainment and 
lower labor force participation identified for girls in these rural, less-educated households (Table 
10).  
                                                           
30 A caveat of this analysis is that the follow-up survey has a significant number of missing values for the number of births. 
Further calculations show that this issue is equally prevalent in both stipend and non-stipend districts. Moreover, the problem of 
missing values does not appear to be systematically correlated with some determinants of fertility. 
31 Estimates from the DD and RDD models shown in tables 4 to 8 were obtained from a DD framework for the whole sample 
with a control function of district literacy rates that determine program eligibility. The fact that the results are very similar may 
suggest that there is low impact heterogeneity across districts. Yet, this does not imply that there is not impact heterogene ity for 




    
  Program impacts on labor force participation also appear to be larger for the poorest 
households. Reductions in labor force participation associated with the FSSP among girls from 
poorer households (those below the median consumption level of the district) are more than 
twice those found for the rest of the beneficiaries. There is also some suggestive evidence that 
participant girls in the poorest households are more likely to delay marriage. 
 
  There is evidence in the data that the effects of the FSSP on educational outcomes vary 
with the year that the girls join the program and the length of exposure. As noted in the previous 
section, the results show that the younger cohorts of girls who joined the program after two years 
of implementation are more likely to complete middle and high school. As noted above, the two 
most plausible reasons of this are an increase in the awareness of the program (due to 
informational campaigns launched in the second year of operation of the program) and the 
expansion of the FSSP introduced in 2006-07 to cover grades 9 and 10. Finally, the analysis also 
shows that girls with more than one year of exposure to the program are more likely than other 
beneficiaries to complete one grade of high school and less likely to be married at the time of the 
survey. This may provide suggestive evidence of positive marginal effects of treatment length.  
 
Impact on Male Siblings 
 
In theory, educational stipends that are targeted to girls could have indirect effects on 
households’ investments in the education of ineligible siblings. Models of schooling decision 
show that, in addition to income and substitution effects, school-focused conditional transfers 
also have a displacement effect. While for eligible children the three effects tend to produce 
positive impacts on enrollment, for ineligible ones the displacement effect often runs in the 
opposite (negative) direction. For instance, due to the income effect of the transfers, budget-
constrained households may be more able to keep all children in school or enroll those out of 
school. In contrast, the displacement effect may incentivize parents to reallocate child work 
(inside and outside the home) away from eligible girls toward boys and other ineligible girls. As 
a result, the net indirect effects of a program depend on the relative size of these opposing forces. 
   
  The existing literature gives mixed evidence on the indirect effects of CCTs on ineligible 




positive income effect in the context of a CCT program (Barrera-Osorio et al. 2008). While the 
program increased the enrollment of recipients, ineligible siblings were more likely to drop out 
of school and enter the labor market. In a contrary example, evidence for a scholarship program 
in Cambodia that targeted poor children making the transition from primary to lower secondary 
school shows that the school enrollment of ineligible siblings was not affected by the program 
(Ferreira et al. 2009).
32 
   
  We exploit three different identification strategies to examine the spillover effects of the 
FSSP effects on current enrollment, school completion (primary and secondary), and school 
choice (private or public) for boys in school age (6 to 17 years old). The first strategy 
implements a DD analysis that compares boys in households with at least one exposed girl in 
stipend districts to similar boys in non-stipend districts at baseline and follow-up. The second 
strategy also looks at relative changes over the longer term but uses boys in households without 
exposed girls in stipend districts as the comparison group. Finally, the third strategy integrates 
both of the designs above in a triple difference framework (DDD).  The analyses draw on 
household data from MICS (2003 and 2007-08), and the subsamples used for each of the 
outcomes are selected based on gender-specific age and grade restrictions.   
   
  None of the empirical models estimated for each of the research designs reveal any 
spillover effects of the program on the enrollment and school completion of boys. The results, 
summarized in Table 11, indicate that the enrollment and school completion rates of boys with 
female siblings who have been exposed to the FSSP exhibit statistically similar trends as boys 
with no eligible siblings in both stipend and non-stipend districts. The only exception is a 
decrease in enrollment of 3 percentage points in one of the models of the DD analysis that is 
based on the comparison with boys living with ineligible girls in stipend districts. Yet, this result 
does not hold when the analysis is extended to DDD models.
33  
   
                                                           
32 The CESSP Scholarship Program in Cambodia provides modest transfers to eligible girls that are equivalent to approximately 
2-3 percent of the total expenditures of the average recipient households. The relative size of the GSP in Pakistan is similar. The 
monthly stipend represents 3.4 percent of median household expenditures of the recipient households in 2004 (Ferreira and others 
2009; Chaudhury and Parajuli 2006). 
33 Results that look at the average years of schooling completed do not reveal any effects either. Comparisons for school-age boys 




  Consistent with what was observed through qualitative work conducted in the field as 
part of this impact evaluation, there is, however, indication of strong indirect effects of the 
program on school choice among boys. We find that families with daughters eligible to the FSSP 
tend to respond to the program by enrolling their sons in private schools. In fact, several 
econometric models show a statistically significant average increase in enrollment of boys in 
private schools of nearly 4 percentage points compared to a baseline level of 30 percent. Further 
analysis indicates that this increase in the share of male enrollment in private schools is largely 
driven by boys 6 to 12 years old who were sent to primary schools.
34 
   
  This behavioral response may be explained by reasons related to the supply, cost, and 
quality of private schools that offer primary-level education. First, there has been a significant 
increase in the number of private primary schools in rural and urban Punjab in the 2000s. 
Second, fees in private schools are often low and below the stipend provided by the FSSP (200 
Rs. per month). In fact, a national census of private schools in 2000 found that the median rural 
private school charged 60 Rs. per month.
35 Third, there are also differences in quality; children 
who study in private schools score substantially higher in tests in all subjects (Andrabi and others 
2006). Therefore, a potential indirect effect of the FSSP may introduce gender disparities in 
learning as more boys in eligible households are enrolled in better performing schools. More 
work, however, is needed to better understand this possible indirect effect. 
 
7. Robustness Checks 
 
As eligibility to the FSSP was not assigned randomly, the analysis conducted in this paper has to 
rely on quasi-experimental techniques and their corresponding identifying assumptions. To 
assess the internal validity of this evaluation, we discuss the robustness of the results to a few 
issues that could contaminate the design of the evaluation. We start with the underlying 
assumption of the double-difference analysis, namely that the outcomes investigated were 
progressing along similar trends across stipend and non-stipend districts before the program 
began.  Program impact estimates based on double-difference models may be biased if either of 
the outcomes for girls in stipend districts (who started from a lower base) was converging to the 
value in control districts even before the program was in place.  
                                                           
34 Aslam (2009) also finds that boys are more likely than girls to enroll in private schools in Punjab. 




   
  Yet, there is no evidence that longer-term impacts of the program identified in this paper 
are driven by differences in pre-program trends. Two main checks were conducted to directly 
investigate this. The first uses pre-baseline and baseline data from PIHS (2001) and MICS 
(2003) to run double-difference models on schooling, labor market, marriage, and fertility 
outcomes for the same cohorts of girls.
36 In principle, one should not expect to see impacts of the 
FSSP since the program began after the period covered by this placebo test. In fact, results of 
this analysis show that all outcomes examined in the paper were progressing in similar trends for 
stipend and non-stipend districts at the preprogram time. The second check consists of double-
difference models using data from MICS (2007-08) to examine the trends of school attainment 
for two slightly older cohorts of girls (ages 20-22 and 23-25) that, by definition, finished school 
before the program started and, thus, did not benefit directly from it. Again, results of these 
exercises do not reveal any differential pre-program trends that may contaminate the main 
findings of the paper (Table 12). 
    
  Another important concern stems from the fact that the empirical analysis is based on a 
proxy measure of the level of exposure of girls to the program. Consequently, program duration 
for the synthetic cohorts used in the analysis is likely measured with some error. This 
measurement error in the indicator of treatment could produce imprecise or biased estimates of 
program impacts. If this is the case, the parameters that measure the effects of the FSSP on the 
longer-term outcomes would be biased toward zero (also known as ―attenuation bias‖). Although 
there is no sensible way to correct for this type of bias in the context of this evaluation, the 
results of the analysis are still very informative as they can be interpreted as lower bounds of the 
true impacts. 
   
  There are various problematic compositional changes in the sample that could take place. 
An example is that the FSSP likely induces the self-selection of lower–ability female students 
into middle schools. The marginal girl who is most likely to be brought into school by the 
                                                           
36 A limitation of this analysis is that PIHS 2001, the household survey used for the prebaseline period, is representative only at 
the province level. The survey was structured around three main domains: rural, major cities, and other urban areas. The first two 
domains (rural and major cities) were stratified by district and, thus, can be used to construct the treatment status of girls. The 
―other urban‖ domain was stratified by division, a higher administrative level that may include both stipend and non-stipend 
districts. Therefore, the DD analysis is restricted to the ―rural‖ and ―major cities‖ domains and assumes that the sample statistics 




stipend program may be, on average, relatively poorer, less motivated, and spend less time on 
school work than the girls who are already enrolled in school.
37 Thus, there is a possibility that at 
least some of these new entrants are drawn from the left-hand side of the ability distribution. As 
a result, there may be a selection bias on the expected returns since the new entrants are expected 
to benefit less from schooling compared to the girls who were already attending school regularly 
before the program started. This type of selection bias may be important for evaluations like this 
one that investigate the impacts on educational indicators such a progression and completion, 
which condition on school enrollment (itself an outcome of the program). Although the findings 
of this paper are not adjusted for the self-selection of lower-ability students, the sign of the bias 
suggests that they still provide lower bounds of the actual impacts.
38 
      
  Similarly, there is no sign the program causes changes to the age-grade distribution in 
stipend districts. In addition to bringing new entrants with relatively lower expected returns into 
school, the program could have motivated overage girls to go back to school. This may add extra 
noise to the construction of the synthetic cohorts and the measures of treatment status. However, 
comparisons of the age-grade distributions at baseline and follow-up within stipend districts, as 
well as between stipend and non-stipend districts, do not indicate that over-age girls are more 
likely to enroll in schools in stipend districts after the FSSP began. Furthermore, various model 
specifications allow for cohorts that are wide enough to capture over-age girls. We do not find 
evidence that migration could affect the composition of the samples of analysis. 
   
  An additional recurrent concern for evaluations of this type is that the program could 
either attract migrants from control regions to stipend regions or stimulate permanent migration 
among program participants. The decision to migrate permanently may be influenced by factors 
that also determine participation in the program and the outcomes of interest (that is, endogenous 
migration). Both issues may alter the composition of the samples in a way that compromises the 
internal validity of the analysis. Yet, there are several reasons why this may be less of an issue in 
this paper. First, the modest size of the transfer (nearly $2.5 per month) is not expected to 
encourage households to move from richer non-stipend districts to stipend districts. Second, out-
                                                           
37 Filmer and Schady (2009) find evidence of this type of selection to explain why a scholarship program targeted to poor 
students in Cambodia does not appear to have positive effects on academic tests. 
38 An alternative to correct for this type of selection is to construct either parametric or nonparametric bounds on quantile-specific 
program impacts based on symmetric truncation of the distribution of the treatment and control groups. See Lee (2002) and 




of-province family migration in both stipend and non-stipend districts is rather uncommon, 
particularly in rural areas. Instead, most migration is in the form of temporary out-migration of a 
member of the household — often of working men. It is very unlikely that this migration was 
affected by the stipend program. Finally, some simple econometric models give no evidence that 
the FSSP affect either type of migration after controlling for most of the covariates used in the 
analysis.  
   
  A final compositional issue could arise if the conditional stipend motivates households 
located in non-stipend districts but adjacent to stipend districts to send their girls to schools there. 
This would increase the demand for education in stipend districts but reduce it in non-stipend 
districts, leading to no changes in net enrollment across the province. In order to check the 
possibility of crossover effects between contiguous stipend and non-stipend districts, 
econometric models of educational outcomes were estimated on a subsample of schools and 
households located in treatment and comparison districts that do not have common borders.
39 
The direction, magnitude, and significance of the findings using these samples are for the most 
part consistent with the results obtained with the full sample, with the exception of some models 
that employ school level data for which the findings are qualitatively similar but not statistically 
significant. 
   
  A natural issue for a program like the FSSP focused exclusively to public schools is 
families could have moved their daughters who were previously enrolled in private schools to 
public schools in order to become eligible for the stipend. As a result, the observed increase in 
female enrollment in the public system may be offset (partially or completely) by a fall in 
enrollment in private schools, hence reducing the overall effectiveness of the program. 
Nevertheless, the main set of results of this paper uses household-level data and defines 
progression and completion irrespective of the type of school in which the girl is enrolled. 
Therefore, the DD and RDD models using these data provide estimates of the net impacts of the 
FSSP that already account for the possible crowding out effect induced by the program.
40 
   
                                                           
39 The sample size of these models is reduced in some cases by more than 50 percent.  
 
40 At baseline, there were no statistically significant differences between stipend and non stipend districts in the proportion  of 




  In order to check for potential issues of selection in participation, we also run empirical 
models for all the outcomes on the sample of girls eligible to the program irrespective of their 
likely participation in the program The sample for this includes girls ages 12-19 that were 
eligible for the program even though they were never enrolled in grades 6-8 during the duration 
of the program. However, although impacts estimates based on this larger cohort are closer to the 
intent-to-treat parameter, a problem of this approach is that the results of this analysis are likely 
to get diluted as the units of observations may include a significant number of girls that did not 
participate; they could have left school before the program started and never rejoined.
41 Yet, 
some of the results from the base models remain.
42  
   
  A final concern for internal validity is that certain impacts on educational outcomes could 
be mistakenly attributed solely to the program when they are actually the combined effects of the 
stipend (a demand-side intervention) and changes on the supply side. This may be the case if 
more schools — particularly public schools — were built at the same time as the program in 
stipend than non-stipend districts. There is, however, no evidence of such systematic change in 
school supply. In fact, data from the annual Punjab school census (EMIS) for the period 2003-10 
shows that the number of public schools was more or less unchanged. For instance, during 2004-
07, the number of schools in stipend and non-stipend districts increased by only 0.34 and 0.15 
percent, respectively, compared to the number of schools at baseline. Furthermore, the trends in 
the school supply of stipend and non-stipend districts are very similar in the period before and 




This paper aims to fill the evidence gap on longer-term impacts of CCTs by evaluating a female- 
targeted CCT program in Pakistan, the Female School Stipend Program. The evidence indicates 
that impacts are sustained beyond the short term and could help reduce gender gaps in schooling. 
                                                           
41 This bigger cohort could be problematic as it may include girls who completed grades 5, 6 and 7 but stopped going to school 
well before the program started 
42 For middle school/grade 9/grade 10 completion, and middle to high school transition outcomes, average impacts on cohort age 
12-17 are not statistically significant but have a positive sign across alternative definitions. However, for the cohort age 15 -16, 
schooling outcomes are positive and statistically significant fo r some definitions. Impacts on labor outcomes are robust to the 
inclusion of eligible but not exposed girls, but with lower significance levels (5% -10%). Results for marriage and fertility 





Indeed, after four years of implementation, the FSSP is found to help girls in stipend districts 
progress through and complete middle school. Furthermore, the younger cohorts of girls in 
stipend districts in particular are also more likely to matriculate into and complete at least one 
high school grade. In terms of labor force participation and marriage and fertility decisions, there 
is some evidence (although in some cases marginally significant in statistical sense) that the 
program encourages girls to work less, delay their marriage, and have fewer children.  
   
  We also find that, as a result of the stipend, boys residing in the same household as girls 
in participating districts are more likely to be enrolled in private primary schools. These schools 
are growing in number, more affordable — school fees are lower than the stipend — and 
perform better in terms of students’ learning, which means the FSSP may indirectly increase the 
gender gap in learning, at least at the primary level. However, further research is needed to 
investigate whether learning disparities may arise as a result of this change in the school choice 
of boys. If this is the case, the evidence should perhaps motivate actions to either address the 
discrepancy in quality between private and public schools or expand the FSSP benefits to include 
private schools so that girls have similar school choice as boys. 
   
  The impacts on educational attainment may have important implications for future 
productivity and welfare of beneficiaries. As in many other developing countries, the gradient 
between education and poverty is evident in Pakistan. Women who complete middle and high 
school, for instance, live in households that enjoy nearly 14 and 29 percent (equivalent to $5.3 
and $10.8) higher monthly consumption per capita, respectively, relative to women with less 
than middle school education. A big part of the reason is that education provides women with 
more marriage opportunities. Another reason is that higher schooling also enables women to 
attain higher earnings. Simple back-of-the-envelope calculations estimate that the female wage 
premiums for middle and high school education (relative to lower than middle school education) 
are 24 and 157 percent, respectively. These improvements represent an annual increase in 
earnings of $16 and $100, respectively, which might more than compensate the annual stipend 
cost of the program ($34). 
   
  In addition, the impacts of the FSSP may have further dynamic effects on other 




fewer children. In fact, women in Punjab with middle and high school education have around 1.8 
fewer children than those with lower than middle school education by the end of their 
reproductive life. Simple extrapolations also indicate that the 1.4 year delay in marriage of 
beneficiaries associated with the program could lead to 0.4 fewer births by the end of their 
childbearing years. Furthermore, more educated women are expected to not only have fewer 
children but also invest more in their human capital, which may lead to positive intergenerational 
effects.  
   
  The results of this paper could provide critical information for policy makers in assessing 
the effectiveness and efficiency of programs like the FSSP; however, more needs to be done in 
future research to more fully explore the dynamics of program impacts and the effects on 
learning. First of all, many of the beneficiaries observed in this paper are still young (12-19 years 
old), so they might not have reached their full potential in terms of human capital. In addition to 
continue investigating the impacts on final school attainment and fertility, more needs to be done 
in subsequent works to identify the effects of the program on future productivity and wages. 
Second, and related to this, it would be useful to understand whether the impacts on schooling 
are also translated into improvements in learning. Knowledge on these areas is critical to 
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Table 1. Educational Outcomes at Baseline 
 
School enrollment (percent)  Years of schooling c 
  Primary (age 6-10)  Middle (age 11-14)  Rural  Urban  Overall 
  Boys  Girls  Overall  Boys  Girls  Overall  Menb  Womenb  Menb  Womenb  Menb  Womenb 
Stipend  50.8  42.0  46.7  24.2  15.9  20.3  4.5  1.8  6.8  5.4  5.0  2.6 
Non-stipend  67.0  66.0  66.5  34.6  34.2  34.4  6.3  4.0  7.8  7.2  6.9  5.2 
Punjab  59.5  55.1  57.4  30.2  26.9  28.6  5.5  3.0  7.5  6.8  6.1  4.2 
Pakistana  56.3  44.4  50.5  30.6  21.9  26.4  5.0  1.8  7.1  5.9  5.7  3.1 
Source: MICS 2003 
a) Data source: PIHS 2001; b) For men and women 15-40  years old; c) Years of schooling is proxied by highest grade completed. Those who have never attended school are assumed 
to have zero years of schooling. Professional degrees (law, medicine, engineering, business) are assumed equivalent to 16 years of education. Those whose highest grade completed 





Table 2. Access to School at Baseline 
 
Access to Primary Schoola  Access to Middle Schoola  Access to High Schoola 
  Rural  Urban  Overall  Rural  Urban  Overall  Rural  Urban  Overall 
Stipend  88.1%  96.6%  89.7%  45.6%  84.8%  53.0%  26.2%  77.6%  35.9% 
Non-stipend  96.2%  97.1%  96.5%  65.8%  89.7%  74.7%  46.5%  83.4%  60.3% 
Punjab  92.3%  97.0%  93.7%  56.2%  88.4%  65.8%  36.8%  82.0%  50.2% 
Source: PSLM 2004 
a. Access is defined as household travel time less than 30 minutes.  




Table 3. Summary Statistics of Covariates at Baseline 
COVARIATES  Non-stipend  Stipend  Difference  SE 
 
Community-level Characteristics 
       
         
Rural  0.643  0.818  0.175***  (0.005) 
Poverty Headcount  0.436  0.672  0.236***  (0.008) 
Access to Primary School^  0.886  0.752  -0.134***  (0.013) 
Access to Middle School^  0.606  0.383  -0.223***  (0.019) 
Access to High School^  0.479  0.232  -0.247***  (0.018) 
Access to Public Transport^  0.746  0.59  -0.156***  (0.018) 
Middle School Private/Public Enrollment Ratio  0.345  0.254  -0.0908***  (0.022) 
Share of Education in Total Expenditure (%)  7.762  6.692  -1.070***  (0.126) 
 
School-level Characteristics 
       
         
Boundary wall - girls middle school^^  0.841  0.848  -0.0067  (0.010) 
Drinking water - girls middle school^^  0.926  0.95  -0.0245***  (0.007) 
Electricity - girls middle school^^  0.744  0.852  -0.108***  (0.012) 
Toilet - girls middle school^^  0.780  0.785  -0.005  (0.011) 
Student Teacher Ratio - girls middle public schools^^  32.443  26.108  -6.335***  (0.423) 
 
Household-level Characteristics 
       
         
Household Size  6.569  6.663  0.0935**  (0.044) 
Dependency Ratio  0.454  0.495  0.0407***  (0.003) 
Education of HH Head~  4.774  3.133  -1.641***  (0.080) 
Gas Connection  0.293  0.047  -0.246***  (0.008) 
Electricity Connection  0.926  0.677  -0.249***  (0.011) 
Visit from Health Worker  0.353  0.338  -0.0150  (0.013) 
Access to Family Planning Center^  0.341  0.209  -0.132***  (0.017) 
Access to Health Center/Hospital^  0.466  0.292  -0.174***  (0.019) 
Access to Drinking Water Supply^  0.957  0.9753  0.0183***  (0.006) 
Source: MICS 2003; ^Source: PSLM 2004; ^^ Source: Annual Public School Census 2003 








Table 4. Construction of Cohorts for School-level Analysis 
 
Grade 6  Grade 7  Grade 8  Grade 9  Grade 10 
2003-2004 (baseline)  Cohort B  Cohort A       
2004-2005 (first year of middle-school stipend)  Cohort C  Cohort B  Cohort A     
2005-2006  Cohort D  Cohort C  Cohort B  Cohort A   
2006-2007 (first year of high-school stipend)  Cohort E  Cohort D  Cohort C  Cohort B  Cohort A 
2007-2008  Cohort F  Cohort E  Cohort D  Cohort C  Cohort B 
2008-2009  Cohort G  Cohort F  Cohort E  Cohort D  Cohort C 
2009-2010  Cohort H  Cohort G  Cohort F  Cohort E  Cohort D 
 
Table 5. Program Impacts on Grade Level Enrollment (percentage) 
  Grade 6  Grade 7  Grade 8  Grade 9  Grade 10 
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Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note: Estimates from parametric RDD (whole sample). ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Cohort 
names are in parentheses 





















































































FSSP*Time  0.00564  0.0120  0.00509  0.0121  0.0416  0.0503*  0.0590**  0.0500*  0.0590**  0.1040*  -0.00713  0.0108  -0.00819  0.0102  0.0556  0.0350  0.0555**  0.0346  0.0554**  0.1272** 
(0.015)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.0302)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.0547)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.0353)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.0566) 
FSSP  -0.0481***  0.00149  -0.0157  0.000589  -0.0640*  -0.0914***  0.0122  -0.0420  0.0155  -0.1467**  -0.0633***  -0.0187  -0.00373  -0.00703  -0.1078*** -0.0940*** -0.00350  -0.0317  0.0291  -0.1654*** 
(0.015)  (0.014)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.0338)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.0596)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.0396)  (0.022)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.033)  (0.0616) 
Time  -0.00974 -0.0179*** -0.00943 -0.0179***  -0.0282  -0.0424*** -0.0605*** -0.0423*** -0.0604***  -0.0772**  0.0144  0.000991  0.0150  0.00126  -0.0430*  -0.0391*** -0.0583*** -0.0390*** -0.0576***  -0.1138*** 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.0207)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.0380)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.0246)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.0397) 
L40-L  No  No  -0.00156**  0.0000874  -0.0002  No  No  -0.00240***  -0.000330  -0.0008  No  No  -0.00286** -0.00143  -0.0037  No  No  -0.00303** -0.00418*  -0.0054 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0067)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.0125)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0079)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.0130) 
Covariates  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Age Fixed  
Effects 
No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
No. of obs  22289  20826  22289  20826  6076  9396  8962  9396  8962  2573  22237  20773  22237  20773  6062  9391  8956  9391  8956  2573 
Table 6. Average Program Impact on Educational Outcomes - I 
Source:   Authors’ calculation 
***1% significance level **5% significance level *10% significance level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Notes:   (1) Standard errors are clustered at the district level. (2) Covariates include household, community and school-level characteristics: rural/urban, birth order, dependency ratio, education of household head, access to water,    
private/public enrollment ratio, access to public transport, gas connection in the house, mean per capita consumption, ratio of middle to high schools, proportion of schools with boundary wall, electricity and drinking water, 
and student-teacher ratio.  3) Non-parametric RD estimates are presented for bandwidth size=4 unless otherwise stated. Bandwidth 4 was the most frequently recurring optimal bandwidth (calculated using Imbens and 
Kalyanamaran’s method (2009)) followed by 9 in our school level data, and so results have been presented for bandwidth 4 unless otherwise specified. Results for other bandwidth choices are available upon request (5) 
Non-parametric RD results are presented for models that use kernel weights, not sampling weights. Results for models using both kernel and sampling weights are available upon request. 
 
Whole Sample (12-19)  Cohort 15-16  Whole Sample (12-19)  Cohort 15-16 

























































FSSP*Time  -0.0146  0.00563  -0.0156  0.00495  0.0229  0.0264  0.0494**  0.0263  0.0495**  0.1206**  -0.0545**  -0.0323  -0.0560**  -0.0339  0.0044  0.0301  0.0285  0.0264  0.0249  0.2538** 
(0.022)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.0407)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.0614)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.0450)  (0.051)  (0.048)  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.1123) 
FSSP  -0.0444*  -0.00577  0.0148  0.00656  -0.0307  -0.0628**  -0.0216  -0.0372  -0.00142  -0.0655  0.00276  0.0722***  0.0641*  0.0928***  -0.0455  -0.0640  0.0652  0.0134  0.144**  -0.1663 
(0.026)  (0.026)  (0.037)  (0.027)  (0.0459)  (0.027)  (0.036)  (0.045)  (0.036)  (0.0685)  (0.031)  (0.023)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.0508)  (0.050)  (0.069)  (0.073)  (0.067)  (0.1286) 
Time  -0.0215  -0.0360**  -0.0210  -0.0357**  -0.0573**  -0.0766*** -0.0955*** -0.0766*** -0.0951*** -0.1491***  0.0669*** 0.0609*** 0.0677*** 0.0615***  0.0420  -0.0779** -0.0707** -0.0756**  -0.0677*  -0.2412*** 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.0291)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.0447)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.0327)  (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.033)  (0.0816) 
L40-L  No  No  -0.00285** -0.00151  0.0092  No  No  -0.00124  -0.00258  0.0168  No  No  -0.00296* -0.00241  -0.0013  No  No  -0.00374 -0.00941**  0.0047 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.0091)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.0136)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.0104)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.0274) 
Covariates  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Age Fixed  
Effects 
No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
No. of obs  19915  18482  19915  18482  5425  8988  8570  8988  8570  2444  12831  11623  12831  11623  3519  2387  2202  2387  2202  666 
a   Results are positive and statistically significant using wider bandwidths and therefore larger sample sizes 
Table 7. Average Program Impact on Educational Outcomes - II 
***1% significance level **5% significance level *10% significance level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source:   Authors’ calculation 
Notes:   (1) Standard errors are clustered at the district level. (2) Covariates include household, community and school-level characteristics: rural/urban, birth order, dependency ratio, education of household head,  access to water ,  
access to public transport, gas connection in the house,  mean per capita consumption, ratio of middle to high schools, proportion of schools with boundary wall, electricity and drinking water, and student-teacher ratio. (3) Non-
parametric RD estimates are presented for bandwidth size=4 unless otherwise stated. Bandwidth 4 was the most frequently recurring optimal bandwidth (calculated using Imbens and Kalyanamaran’s method (2009)) followed by 9 in 
our school level data, and so results have been presented for bandwidth 4 unless otherwise specified. Results for other bandwidth choices are available upon request (5) Non-parametric RD results are presented for models that use 
kernel weights, not sampling weights. Results for models using both kernel and sampling weights are available upon request. 
Outcome C. Grade 9 Completion  Outcome D. Grade 10 Completion 



















































































RDD  b 
(1) 
FSSP*Time  -0.0467** -0.0494** -0.0465** -0.0490**  -0.0154  -0.0452*** -0.0403** -0.0452*** -0.0401**  -0.0403*  0.897  -0.611  0.417  -0.548  -11.5698***  0.0744  -6.088*  -0.392  -6.137*  -17.0783*** 
(0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.0143)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.0228)  (1.671)  (2.037)  (1.727)  (2.077)  (2.1609)  (2.494)  (3.107)  (2.873)  (3.139)  (3.0777) 
FSSP  0.0471***  0.0427*  0.0391*  0.0309  0.0157  0.0493***  0.0528**  0.0549***  0.0431*  0.0230  -0.632  -3.405**  -3.465**  -4.046**  26.9624***  -0.309  3.631  -2.296  3.342  26.8686*** 
(0.016)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.0167)  (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.0261)  (1.192)  (1.292)  (1.481)  (1.644)  (1.6559)  (1.530)  (4.731)  (2.176)  (5.234)  (2.1383) 
Time  0.0193  0.0188  0.0192  0.0186  0.0151  0.0222*  0.0226*  0.0222*  0.0224*  0.0304*  -0.711  1.393  -0.351  1.294  10.6635***  -1.699  3.380  -1.351  3.361  14.6414*** 
(0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.0102)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.0158)  (1.281)  (1.828)  (1.306)  (1.841)  (1.6270)  (2.253)  (2.514)  (2.566)  (2.533)  (2.4932) 
L40-L  No  No  0.000387 0.00202**  -0.0037  No  No  -0.000270 0.00180**  -0.0006  No  No  0.178**  0.0711  -4.2563***  No  No  0.145  0.0390  -2.9914*** 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0035)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0058)  (0.072)  (0.163)  (0.3983)  (0.160)  (0.305)  (0.6369) 
Covariates  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Age Fixed  
Effects 
No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
No. of obs  27448  26037  27448  26037  7464  9090  8672  9090  8672  2479  292  273  292  273  189  125  120  125  120  92 
b   Results for days worked are presented for bandwidth 9. There were 54 observations only for bandwidth 4. Note that results are consistently negative and statistically significant for bandwidths lower and higher than 9 
Table 8. Average Program Impact on Labor Outcomes  
Source:   Authors’ calculation 
Notes:   (1) Standard errors are clustered at the district level. (2) Covariates include household, community and school-level characteristics: rural/urban, birth order, dependency ratio, education of household head, access to drinking 
water supply, access to   school,                                        public transport, gas connection in the house, mean per capita consumption, ratio of middle to high schools, proportion of schools with boundary wall, electricity and drinking water, and student-teacher 
ratio. (3) Non-parametric RD estimates are presented for bandwidth size=4 unless otherwise stated. Bandwidth 4 was the most frequently recurring optimal bandwidth (calculated using Imbens and Kalyanamaran’s method (2009)) 
followed by 9 in our school level data, and so results have been presented for bandwidth 4 unless otherwise specified. Results for other bandwidth choices are available upon request (5) Non-parametric RD results are presented for 
models that use kernel weights, not sampling weights. Results for models using both kernel and sampling weights are available upon request. 
 
( 
Outcome E. Labor Force Participation  Outcome F. Work Intensity (days per month) 
Whole Sample (12-19)  Cohort 15-16  Whole Sample (15-19)  Cohort 15-17 

























































RDD  c 
(1) 
FSSP*Time  0.00953  0.00820  0.00940  0.00814  -0.0146  -0.151  1.460**  -0.0767  1.222*  -0.1044  -0.0114  -0.0808  -0.0257  -0.0691  -0.0387  0.0962  -0.329*  0.0663  -0.349*  -0.0386 
(0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.0141)  (0.388)  (0.621)  (0.458)  (0.643)  (0.6967)  (0.121)  (0.172)  (0.122)  (0.173)  (0.1353)  (0.150)  (0.181)  (0.149)  (0.209)  (0.1780) 
FSSP  0.00962  0.0132  0.0185  0.0143*  0.0125  -0.202  -0.0353  -0.588  0.230  0.5494  0.0232  0.0825  0.129  0.0396  0.4586***  -0.0387  0.305*  0.182  0.358*  0.4532*** 
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.0143)  (0.391)  (0.439)  (0.865)  (0.460)  (0.8259)  (0.099)  (0.181)  (0.154)  (0.197)  (0.0949)  (0.122)  (0.158)  (0.182)  (0.209)  (0.1247) 
Time  -0.00695*  -0.00506  -0.00689*  -0.00503  0.0043  1.689***  0.803  1.610***  0.697  1.2851**  -0.0188  -0.152  0.00204  -0.157  0.0620  -0.0613  0.0967  -0.0180  0.112  0.1333 
(0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.0088)  (0.285)  (0.478)  (0.359)  (0.488)  (0.5388)  (0.072)  (0.130)  (0.074)  (0.131)  (0.0908)  (0.091)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.130)  (0.1186) 
L40-L  -0.000430  -0.000164  0.0007  0.0173  -0.0538*  0.1891**  No  No  -0.00511  0.00789  0.0390**  No  No  -0.0106  -0.00840  0.0329 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.0032)  (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.0909)  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.0157)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.0205) 
Covariates  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Age Fixed  
Effects 
No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
No. of obs  19177  17761  19177  17761  5251  339  296  339  296  171  392  342  392  342  187  392  342  392  342  186 
c   Results for days worked are presented for bandwidth 9. There were around 100 observations for bandwidth 4.  
***1% significance level **5% significance level *10% significance level. Standard errors are in parentheses.   
Source:  Authors’ calculation 
Notes:  (1) Standard errors are clustered at the district level. (2) Covariates include household, community and school-level characteristics: rural/urban, birth order, household size, dependency ratio, education of household head, access to school,  
private/public enrollment ratio, access to transport, gas connection in the house, mean per capita consumption, ratio of middle to high schools, status of school facilities, student-teacher ratio. (3) Additional covariates for fertility outcomes include access to  
Lady Health Worker, and access to Family Planning Centre  (4) Non-parametric RD estimates are presented for bandwidth size=4 unless otherwise stated. Bandwidth 4 was the most frequently recurring optimal bandwidth (calculated using Imbens and 
Kalyanamaran’s method (2009)) followed by 9 in our school level data, and so results have been presented for bandwidth 4 unless otherwise specified. Results for other bandwidth choices are available upon request (6) Non-parametric RD results are 
presented for models that use kernel weights, not sampling weights. Results for models using both kernel and sampling weights are available upon request. 
Table  9. Average Program Impact on Marriage & Fertility Outcomes  
Outcome J. Number of Children 
Whole Sample (15-19)  Whole Sample (15-19) 
Outcome H: Age at Marriage 
Whole Sample (17-19)  Whole Sample (17-19) 
Outcome I. Probability of Giving Birth  Outcome G. Probability of Marriage  
43 
Table 10. Heterogeneity of Impacts 
  Rural  Poverty  Parental Education  Exposure  Age 
      None  Primary  One  12-14  15-16 
Middle School Completion   -0.0558*  -0.0594**  -0.0813**  0.0161  -0.0144  0.0434  0.0910** 
  (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
                Middle to High Transition  -0.0707*  -0.0462  -0.0508  0.000510  -0.0318  0.0507  0.0834** 
  (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.049)  (0.046)  (0.059)  (0.045)  (0.034) 
               
Grade 9 Completion  -0.0944*  -0.0419  -0.0417  0.0403  -0.0727  0.0490  0.0796** 
  (0.048)  (0.046)  (0.069)  (0.059)  (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.031) 
                Grade 10 Completion  -0.0820**  -0.0577  0.00530  -0.0983  -0.0847  0.0309  0.0849 
  (0.033)  (0.038)  (0.052)  (0.091)  (0.060)  (0.173)  (0.054) 
               
Labor Force Participation  -0.0605**  -0.0390  -0.0168  0.0118  -0.0361*  0.0658  0.0401 
  (0.027)  (0.038)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.042)  (0.035) 
               
Work Intensity  -3.807  4.403  -0.0298  0.00912  -4.956    -5.776* 
  (4.660)  (3.494)  (0.032)  (0.037)  (6.414)    (3.316) 
               
Married  -0.00610  0.0188  -0.0410**  -0.000156  0.0550***    0.000657 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.023)  (0.017)    (0.015) 
               
Age at Marriage  1.441  -2.822*  0.110  1.355  0.204     
  (1.410)  (1.402)  (0.738)  (0.810)  (0.984)     
               
Gave birth  -0.0471**  -0.0291  0.00114  -0.0336  0.0660***     
  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.030)  (0.021)     
               
Number of Children  -0.531  -0.378  0.330  -0.406  0.239     
  (0.451)  (0.377)  (0.257)  (0.506)  (0.369)     
***1% significance level **5% significance level *10% significance level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Notes: (1) Standard errors urban, birth order, household size, are clustered at the district level. (2) All specifications included 
household, community and school-level covariates: rural/dependency ratio, education of household head, access to drinking water 
supply, access to school, private/public enrollment ratio, access to public transport, gas connection in the house, mean per capita 
consumption, ratio of middle to high schools, proportion of schools with boundary wall, electricity and drinking water, and student-
teacher ratio among others 




Table 11. Program Spillover Effects on Boys 
 
Whole sample (age 6-17)    Age 6-12   
  Value at 
Baseline 












91.1Τ  0.898  1.03  -2.38 
 
94.1 Τ  0.00519  0.00519  -3.29 





76.3 Τ  -1.09  -0.996  -8.3         





30.6 Τ  3.75**  3.77**  -10.6**  34.0 Τ  11.0***  11.0***  -9.3* 
  (1.9)  (1.9)  (3.8)    (2.6)  (2.6)  (4.9) 
Years of 
schooling 
4.2  -0.00449  0.00182  0.2299  2.5  -0.0756  -0.0756  0.0811 
  (0.079)  (0.079)  (0.231)    (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.196) 
***1% significance level **5% significance level *10% significance level. Standard errors are in parentheses.   
Τ baseline value is expressed in percentages 
Source: Authors’ calculation  
Notes: (1) All specifications included household, school and community covariates: rural/urban, birth order, 
dependency ratio, education of household head, access to school, private/public enrollment ratio, access to water 
supply, age of household head, access to public transport, gas connection in the house, mean per capita consumption, 
initial enrollment rate, ratio of middle to high schools and ratio primary to middle schools, status of school facilities and 
student-teacher ratio, among others. (2) All specifications control for age-fixed effects. (3) See endnote 39 for an 
explanation of RDD estimates. (4) Baseline value is given for stipend districts (5) Non-parametric RD estimates are 
presented for bandwidth size=4. Results for other bandwidth choices are available upon request (5) Non-parametric 
RD results are presented for models that use kernel weights, not sampling weights. Results for models using both 
kernel and sampling weights are also available upon request 
 




Table 12. Robustness Check - Pre-Program Trends 









Participation  Married 
Interaction  0.0228  -0.103  -0.0271  -0.0593  -0.0127 
  (0.066)  (0.063)  (0.060)  (0.041)  (0.018) 
           
 







Completion     
Interaction  -0.00638  -0.0441  -0.0418     
  (0.026)  (0.044)  (0.045)     
Coefficients shows correspond to the interaction between the dummy for stipend districts and the dummy t for time (t=1 
for observations at baseline, t=0 at pre-baseline) ***1% significance level **5% significance level *10% significance 
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Annex A. Geographical Coverage of the Program 
 
 
   
Notes: (1) The districts with stars are covered by the stipend program. (2) The shaded areas represent district-level literacy rate 
amongst population 10 years and older (see legend below) 
 








Annex B. Construction of the Samples for Analysis 
The household-level analysis draws mostly on two rounds of the Multiple Indicators Cluster 
Survey (MICS). The first round was undertaken in 2003 and the second in 2007-08, both are 
cross-sectional. Neither of these rounds was intended to collect data on the program, nor did they 
ask any questions regarding participation in the FSSP. However, both rounds of MICS had 
questions on: (1) age; (2) district of residence; (3) gender; (4) school enrollment in the current 
year; (5) school enrollment in the previous year; (6) grade level in the current year; (7) grade 
level in the previous year; and (8) highest grade completed. 
Girls eligible to receive the stipend must be enrolled in grades 6-8 in a public school in any of 
the 15 low literacy districts. In the absence of any identifying information in the MICS or any 
other household survey on program participation, the analysis relies on the questions on age and 
enrollment (see above) in the MICS to construct synthetic cohorts of the relevant group - girls 
that were likely to be exposed to the program for at least one year since 2003-04. The motivation 
for constructing synthetic cohorts based on age AND grade criteria, as opposed to only an age 
based criterion, was to arrive at a cohort that is more reflective of actual participants.
43 For 
instance, at baseline, 49% of girls age 12-19 in stipend districts had never ever attended school as 
opposed to 21% in non stipend districts. Under an exclusively age-based criterion, these girls 
would have been misidentified as exposed to FSSP, although it was impossible for these girls to 
participate in the program since its implementation.
44  
This annex discusses the three criteria used to construct the cohorts of possibly participant girls. 
In addition to this, the annex presents detailed examples of different combinations of age and 
schooling that also need to be addressed to ensure that the educational histories of girls are 
imputed correctly. The criteria are the following: 
1.  The first criterion applies to girls who were enrolled in either 2007-08 and/or 2006-07. 
Hence,  
a.  If a girl was enrolled in 2006-07 in grades 6-8, she is considered exposed to the 
FSSP. Enrollment and grade level in 2006-07 allow us to determine exposure for two 
possible enrollment scenarios: (i) the girl was enrolled in 2006-07 as well as in 2007-08, 
and (ii) the girl was enrolled in 2006-07 but not enrolled in 2007-08. 
b.  However, there is a third possible enrollment scenario, in which a girl was not 
enrolled in 2006-07 but was enrolled in 2007-08. In this scenario, a girl who was enrolled 
in 2007-08 in grades 7-8 is considered exposed.
45 
However, girls exposed to the program in its early years will no longer be in grades 6-8 in either 
2006-07 or 2007-08. For example, a girl who was in grade 7 in the academic year 2003-04 (so 
exposed to the program) would be in grade 11 in 2007-08. Therefore, if a girl was enrolled in 
                                                           
43. As mentioned before, participation in the program is based on enrollment in grades 6-8; moreover, there is no restriction on 
the girls being a certain age for them to enroll in grades 6-8. 
44. We also do not find evidence of increase in grade 4-5 enrollment (enrollment in these grade levels more likely to be affected 
by the program) or primary school completion in stipend districts relative to non-stipend districts over time for girls age 12-17 
45. Since the 2007-08 survey is conducted two months after the beginning of the academic year 2007-08, the girls enrolled in 




grades 9-11 in 2006-07, she is considered exposed. As before, this addresses the two enrollment 
scenarios: (i) the girl was enrolled in both 2006-07 and 2007-08, and (ii) the girl was enrolled in 
2006-07 but not in 2007-08. 
The underlying assumption here is that these girls progressed through their school years without 
any break. For instance, a girl enrolled in grade 11 in 2006-07 is assumed to have been exposed, 
the assumption being that she was enrolled in grade 8 in 2003-04, and then moved onto grade 9 
in 2004-05, grade 10 in 2005-06, and finally grade 11 in 2006-07. The two exceptions to this 
assumption are: (1) grade repetition, and (2) reentry. To illustrate each of these exceptions, two 
examples are presented:  
a.  If a girl was enrolled in grade 11 in 2006-07, she is considered exposed as it is 
assumed that she was in grade 8 in 2003-04 (year 1 of the program). However, this 
girl may have repeated grade 9 in which case she would have been in grade 9 in 
2003-04 and not grade 8, so in actuality was not exposed. 
b.  If a girl was enrolled in grade 11 in 2006-07, she is considered exposed as it is 
assumed that she was in grade 8 in 2003-04 (year 1 of the program). However, this 
girl may have finished grade 8 in 2002-03, and rejoined a year later in 2004-05 in 
grade 9, so was not exposed to the program. 
In both the above examples, the girls are misidentified as exposed when they have not been in 
grades 6-8 since the start of the program. However, baseline data suggest that both repetition and 
reentry at the secondary school level are very low: around 0.5 percent of the girls enrolled in 
secondary grades are repeaters or rejoiners. Not only is the proportion of such girls very low, 
there are no statistically significant differences in their proportions between stipend and non-
stipend districts at baseline or over time.  
2.  The second criterion is based on age-grade distribution and applies to girls who were not 
enrolled in either 2006-07 or 2007-08 and only their highest grade completed is observed. 
, but NOT the year of completion. Before using the age-grade distribution to determine 
program exposure, two restrictions were imposed to define the sample for who program 
exposure is a possibility: 
a.  Girls whose highest grade completed is grade 5 or below were excluded. This is 
because for a girl to be exposed to the program, she must have at least completed 
grade 6.  
  One may argue that it is possible that a girl was enrolled in grade 6 but did not 
pass, in which case her highest completed grade would be reported as grade 5. 
However, baseline data indicate that only 0.7 percent of girls enrolled in grade 
6 did not pass so the exclusion error in the case of this restriction is very 
small. 
b.  Girls whose highest grade completed is grade 11 or above were excluded. For 




08 could have finished grade 11 was in 2005-06, in which case she would have been 
in grade 9 in 2003-04 (year 1 of the program), hence not exposed.  
Figure 1. Age-Grade Distribution at Baseline 
 
The age-grade distribution at baseline is then used to determine if any of these girls who were 
not in school in either 2006-07 or 2007-08 and whose highest grade completed was between 6 
and 10, were exposed to the program for at least one year between 2003-04 and 2005-06. The 
graph above shows the distribution of ages among grades 6-8 at baseline.
46 To illustrate the 
construction process, an example is presented:  
a.  A girl whose age was 16 in 2007-08 and whose highest grade completed is grade 7 
would have been exposed to the program only if she was in grades 6 or 7 in at least 
2003-04. The only way she could not have been exposed to the program was if she 
completed grade 7 before the program began, say in 2002-03. In 2002-03, this girl 
was 11 years old, and from the age-grade distribution it is evident that an 11 year old 
is not very likely to be in grade 7 but is more likely to be in a lower grade. Hence, this 
girl is assumed to have completed grade 7 after the program began and is therefore 
considered exposed. Similarly, a girl who is 19 years old and her highest grade 
completed is grade 6 is not considered exposed as she would have been 15 years old 
when the program began, and the likelihood of her being in grade 6 in 2003-04 at age 
15 is very low, and she is assumed to have finished grade 6 prior to the program.  
3.  The third criterion was to further restrict the sample cohorts to ages 12-19. After the first 
two criteria were implemented, girls between the ages 8-24 were identified to be in the 
treatment group. The sample was then further restricted to girls 12-19, who constituted 
approximately  95 percent of all the girls identified as exposed after imposing the first 
two criteria. This is akin to treatment of outliers, and a safeguard against misreporting. 
For instance, a girl who is 8 years of age is highly unlikely to have completed 6.  
 
                                                           
46. The age-grade distribution at baseline is used for two reasons: (1) The program impacts in the first few years were low as there 
was very little awareness of the program, the program had not been scaled up, and implementation maturity was yet to be reached 
so the age-grade distribution during 2004-05 and 2005-06 is better proxied by age distribution at baseline than at follow-up. (2) 
The age-grade distribution at follow-up is fairly similar at baseline meaning that there has been no major shifts in age-grade 


































Continuity Checks for Individual and School Level Variables 
Consumption per Capita  Education of Household Head  Rural 
     
Dependency Ratio  Access to Middle School  Share of Education in HH Expenditure 
     
Schools with Boundary Wall  Schools with Drinking Water  Student Teacher Ratio 
     
Schools with Electricity  Log of Enrollment in Grades 6-8  Schools with Toilets 
     
Private-Public Enrollment Ratio  Ratio of High to Middle Schools  Accsss to Public Transport 
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School Level RD Analysis of % Changes in Enrollment between 2004 and 2009 relative to 2003 
Bandwidth=4 
  % Change in Grade 6 
Enrollment 
% Change in Grade 7 
Enrollment 
% Change in Grade 8 
Enrollment 
% Change in Grade 9  
Enrollment 
% Change in Grade 10 
Enrollment 
2004 
         
2005 
     
   
2006 
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FSSP 0.0077 0.0090 0.3606*** 0.0717** 0.0618* -0.1625 0.0277 0.0704 0.1876** -0.0764 -0.0048 0.7291 -0.0867 -0.1007 -0.1303
(0.0319) (0.0343) (0.0722) (0.0315) (0.0331) (0.1209) (0.0450) (0.0467) (0.0904) (0.0792) (0.1317) (0.5911) (0.0586) (0.0678) (0.1575)
Li-L40 No 0.0003 0.0799*** No -0.0021 -0.0538 No 0.0090*** 0.0164 No 0.0090 0.0883*** No -0.0018 -0.0592
(0.0019) (0.0213) (0.0025) (0.0367) (0.0031) (0.0254) (0.0104) (0.0300) (0.0051) (0.0386)
Covariates Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Additional 
Programs
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Number of 
Observations









































FSSP 0.1457*** 0.1350*** 0.2187** 0.1681*** 0.1844*** 0.2782*** 0.1083** 0.1222** 0.1335 -0.1893* -0.1291 0.7467** -0.1719** -0.2203** -0.0942
(0.0370) (0.0393) (0.0868) (0.0386) (0.0405) (0.1019) (0.0544) (0.0540) (0.1305) (0.1041) (0.0996) (0.3304) (0.0867) (0.1022) (0.2731)
Li-L40 No -0.0023 0.0060 No 0.0035 0.0123 No 0.0030 -0.0208 No 0.0076 0.1236*** No -0.0061 -0.0517
(0.0022) (0.0233) (0.0029) (0.0282) (0.0037) (0.0376) (0.0075) (0.0412) (0.0064) (0.0729)
Covariates Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Additional 
Programs
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Number of 
observations
4944 4944 1587 4944 4944 1587 4944 4944 1587 1516 1516 406 1489 1489 405
***1% significance level **5% significance level *10% significance level
Source: Authors' calculations
Notes: (1) Non-parametric RD estimates are done for bandwidth four. Optimal bandwidth was calculated using the method suggested by Imbens and Kalyanamaran (2009). The most frequently recurring optimal bandwidth for outcome 
variables across all years was in the neighborhood of 4, so non-parametric RD estimates are presented for this bandwidth. Results unqiue to each outcome's optimal bandwidth as well as for ad hoc bandwidth choices (2 to 12) are 
available upon request. (2) In the case of grade 8 enrollment in 2006, grade 10 enrollment in 2007, and  grade 10 enrollment in 2010, adding a quadratic term (for Li-L40) gives statistically significant estimates (3) Difference and 
Difference and Parametric RD estimates without any controls, as well as estimates with baseline covariates but no additional program controls are available upon request (4) Covariates include status of school facilities (boundary 
wall, electricity, toilet, drinking water), student teacher ratio, locaton of school (rural), log of initial enrollment, private to public enrollment ratio. and other community characteristics (e.g. poverty, access) (5) Additional programs 
include contract teacher recruitment, program for re-building missing facilities and upgrading school infrastructure, and new school construction or upgradation. 
% Change in Grade 6 Enrollment % Change in Grade 7 Enrollment % Change in Grade 8 Enrollment % Change in Grade 9 Enrollment % Change in Grade 10 Enrollment
2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
% Change in Grade 6 Enrollment % Change in Grade 7 Enrollment % Change in Grade 8 Enrollment % Change in Grade 9 Enrollment % Change in Grade 10 Enrollment













































(iii) (iii) (i) (iii) (iii) (i) (iii) (iii) (i) (iii) (iii) (i) (iii) (iii) (i)
FSSP 0.2126*** 0.1924*** 0.4846*** 0.2626*** 0.2347*** -0.0824 0.0948 0.1160* 0.5094*** -0.1396 -0.1053 0.3502** -0.3711* -0.3683 0.2250
(0.0418) (0.0460) (0.0965) (0.0444) (0.0452) (0.1304) (0.0673) (0.0657) (0.1461) (0.1055) (0.1022) (0.1436) (0.2032) (0.2257) (0.2546)
Li-L40 No -0.0043 0.0679*** No -0.0060* -0.0867** No 0.0045 0.0375 No 0.0044 0.1224*** No 0.0004 -0.0105
(0.0030) (0.0228) (0.0032) (0.0371) (0.0044) (0.0414) (0.0065) (0.0468) (0.0091) (0.0617)
Covariates Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Additional 
Programs
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Number of 
observations









































FSSP 0.2058*** 0.1551*** 0.4479*** 0.3823*** 0.3613*** 0.1838 0.2708*** 0.2636*** 0.3292** -0.0342 0.0054 1.0996*** -0.2282 -0.1654 0.4164
(0.0397) (0.0430) (0.1001) (0.0486) (0.0502) (0.1216) (0.0619) (0.0609) (0.1365) (0.1057) (0.1025) (0.3547) (0.1675) (0.1929) (0.3112)
Li-L40 No -0.0108*** 0.0515** No -0.0045 -0.0422 No -0.0015 0.0004 No 0.0050 0.1189*** No 0.0079 0.0339
(0.0026) (0.0258) (0.0033) (0.0340) (0.0042) (0.0387) (0.0083) (0.0405) (0.0096) (0.0656)
Covariates Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Additional 
Programs
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Number of 
observations
4903 4903 1597 4903 4903 1597 4903 4903 1597 1458 1458 407 1433 1433 407
***1% significance level **5% significance level *10% significance level
Source: Authors' calculations
Notes: (1) Non-parametric RD estimates are done for bandwidth four. Optimal bandwidth was calculated using the method suggested by Imbens and Kalyanamaran (2009). The most frequently recurring optimal bandwidth for outcome 
variables across all years was in the neighborhood of 4, so non-parametric RD estimates are presented for this bandwidth. Results unqiue to each outcome's optimal bandwidth as well as for ad hoc bandwidth choices (2 to 12) are 
available upon request. (2) In the case of grade 8 enrollment in 2006, grade 10 enrollment in 2007, and  grade 10 enrollment in 2010, adding a quadratic term (for Li-L40) gives statistically significant estimates (3) Difference and 
Difference and Parametric RD estimates without any controls, as well as estimates with baseline covariates but no additional program controls are available upon request (4) Covariates include status of school facilities (boundary 
wall, electricity, toilet, drinking water), student teacher ratio, locaton of school (rural), log of initial enrollment, private to public enrollment ratio. and other community characteristics (e.g. poverty, access) (5) Additional programs 
include contract teacher recruitment, program for re-building missing facilities and upgrading school infrastructure, and new school construction or upgradation. 
% Change in Grade 6 Enrollment % Change in Grade 7 Enrollment % Change in Grade 8 Enrollment % Change in Grade 9 Enrollment % Change in Grade 10 Enrollment
2006 2006 2006 2006 2006
% Change in Grade 6 Enrollment % Change in Grade 7 Enrollment % Change in Grade 8 Enrollment % Change in Grade 9 Enrollment % Change in Grade 10 Enrollment













































FSSP 0.1703*** 0.1243*** 0.3080*** 0.2644*** 0.2160*** 0.1390 0.2931*** 0.2731*** 0.4069*** -0.0495 -0.0391 0.9130** -0.2292 -0.2132 0.7551**
(0.0409) (0.0436) (0.1028) (0.0510) (0.0518) (0.1399) (0.0648) (0.0670) (0.1549) (0.1124) (0.1164) (0.4608) (0.3001) (0.3545) (0.2934)
Li-L40 No -0.0096*** 0.0211 No -0.0101*** -0.0102 No -0.0042 0.0128 No 0.0013 0.1128** No 0.0019 0.0200
(0.0028) (0.0282) (0.0035) (0.0431) (0.0042) (0.0453) (0.0100) (0.0447) (0.0151) (0.0546)
Covariates Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Additional 
Programs
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Number of 
observations









































FSSP 0.1583*** 0.1397*** 0.3444*** 0.2838*** 0.2481*** 0.0533 0.2481*** 0.2339*** 0.4395** -0.0427 0.1175 1.0675*** -0.3233 -0.1720 0.6104
(0.0433) (0.0460) (0.1181) (0.0480) (0.0511) (0.1285) (0.0707) (0.0692) (0.1976) (0.1294) (0.1360) (0.3800) (0.3537) (0.4065) (0.4059)
Li-L40 No -0.0039 0.0175 No -0.0075** -0.0582 No -0.0030 0.0134 No 0.0198* 0.1196** No 0.0186 0.0159
(0.0034) (0.0292) (0.0034) (0.0366) (0.0047) (0.0556) (0.0103) (0.0472) (0.0164) (0.0781)
Covariates Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Additional 
Programs
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Number of 
observations
4874 4874 1585 4874 4874 1585 4874 4874 1585 1446 1446 402 1420 1420 401
***1% significance level **5% significance level *10% significance level
Source: Authors' calculations
Notes: (1) Non-parametric RD estimates are done for bandwidth four. Optimal bandwidth was calculated using the method suggested by Imbens and Kalyanamaran (2009). The most frequently recurring optimal bandwidth for outcome 
variables across all years was in the neighborhood of 4, so non-parametric RD estimates are presented for this bandwidth. Results unqiue to each outcome's optimal bandwidth as well as for ad hoc bandwidth choices (2 to 12) are 
available upon request. (2) In the case of grade 8 enrollment in 2006, grade 10 enrollment in 2007, and  grade 10 enrollment in 2010, adding a quadratic term (for Li-L40) gives statistically significant estimates (3) Difference and 
Difference and Parametric RD estimates without any controls, as well as estimates with baseline covariates but no additional program controls are available upon request (4) Covariates include status of school facilities (boundary 
wall, electricity, toilet, drinking water), student teacher ratio, locaton of school (rural), log of initial enrollment, private to public enrollment ratio. and other community characteristics (e.g. poverty, access) (5) Additional programs 
include contract teacher recruitment, program for re-building missing facilities and upgrading school infrastructure, and new school construction or upgradation. 
% Change in Grade 6 Enrollment % Change in Grade 7 Enrollment % Change in Grade 8 Enrollment % Change in Grade 9 Enrollment % Change in Grade 10 Enrollment
2008 2008 2008 2008 2008
% Change in Grade 6 Enrollment % Change in Grade 7 Enrollment % Change in Grade 8 Enrollment % Change in Grade 9 Enrollment % Change in Grade 10 Enrollment
2009 2009 2009 2009 2009